6 Prin. L.J.F. ____

When the State Absolves Itself: Legal Limits on Peru’s 2025 Amnesty Law for Past Atrocities

Jacob Cervantes


VOLUME 6

ISSUE 2

Spring 2026

Few actions undermine the rule of law more decisively than granting legal forgiveness and amnesty for crimes that the world has defined as ‘unforgivable’. Yet on August 13, 2025, then-President Dina Boluarte signed Law No. 32419, granting amnesty to members of Peru’s armed forces and police for human rights violations and other crimes committed between 1980 and 2000. The law also pardons those over the age of 70 who have already been convicted of crimes from that period. This amnesty law goes even further than Law No. 32107, enacted on August 9, 2024, which imposed a statute of limitations on related crimes before 2002, threatening justice for roughly 69,000 victims of the armed conflict. In light of Inter-American Court Rulings and Peru’s international obligations, Peru’s recent amnesty law (Law No. 32419) is in clear violation of international and domestic law and denies survivors of state-sponsored violence the accountability they are owed, ultimately undermining the rule of law.

In order to consider the impact of this amnesty law, it is necessary first to examine the violence of Peru’s internal armed conflict from 1980 to 2000 and the country’s earlier attempts at amnesty. During the 1980s, the Shining Path or Sendero Luminoso emerged as a powerful Marxist-Leninist-Maois insurgency group led by philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán whose ultimate intent was to overthrow the Peruvian government and establish a communist state. It was during this conflict and into the 1990s that the United States provided significant monetary aid through USAID to the Peruvian state and planned on providing special forces to train and advise Peruvian military officials and troops. These actions were taken with the intent to suppress and end the Shining Path movement. As a result of these internal tensions between insurgent groups and the state of Peru, around 70,000 Peruvians, primarily indigenous, were killed or forcibly disappeared. According to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 2003 Final Report, insurgent groups like the Shining Path were responsible for 54% of deaths and disappearances while the state of Peru accounted for 37%. Furthermore, state agents accounted for 75% of cases related to torture and 83% of those related to sexual violence.

In 1995, President Alberto Fujimori, who governed Peru from 1990 to 2000, signed Law No. 26479, which provided blanket amnesty for members of the armed forces and police accused of grave human rights violations between May 1980 and June 1995. This was then cemented by Act No. 26492, which prevented the judiciary from questioning this amnesty law after a lower court judge had ruled that the law was unconstitutional. However, after the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in Barrios Altos v. Peru that the 1995 amnesty law was incompatible with the American Convention and lacked legal effect, Peru’s transitional government accepted the ruling, allowing for criminal prosecutions of many government and military officials. Although the reason why the Peruvian legislature was willing to overturn Law No. 26479 largely depends on the political composition of its legislature at the time, it is likely that mounting international pressure and attention helped motivate the overturning of this amnesty law. 

Yet, more than two decades later, Peru’s right-wing-dominated Congress passed Law No. 32419, and then-President Boluarte signed it into law. The motivations for this blanket amnesty law cannot be empirically established, although its proponents argued that amnesty was a practical solution to the excessively long criminal proceedings caused by the Peruvian judiciary’s inefficiency. Other potential motivations include shielding military members from prosecution and reconstructing narratives surrounding the Fujimori regime. These are the most plausible motivations for right-wing groups within the Peruvian legislature, which includes Fujimori’s political party Fuerza Popular (Popular Force). Additionally, although Boluarte was elected vice president on the Marxist-Leninist Perú Libre ticket, she broke with the party after assuming the presidency and aligned herself with right-wing factions in Congress. 

The illegality of Peru’s amnesty laws lies in their blatant violation of both international standards and the Peruvian Constitution, which guarantees the right to seek justice and upholds democratic values such as accountability under the law. Several international standards prohibit amnesty for state-sponsored crimes, including the United Nations’ Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity and Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Since these declarations were passed by the U.N. General Assembly and recognize victims’ right to legal remedy, Peru’s amnesty laws are fundamentally opposed to international law. That being said, such international principles, while considered international law, are considered soft laws and thus, non-binding. But, according to Article 55 of the Peruvian constitution, treaties that are ratified by the state of Peru have the force of national law and are considered a part of the country’s domestic legal system. When looking at legally binding examples, Peru ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 2012, which forces them, among other obligations in Part I Articles 3-6, to investigate forced disappearances, classify such offenses under criminal law, and define forced disappearances as “crimes against humanity”.

Another pivotal treaty that Peru signed onto in 1977 was the American Convention on Human Rights, which subjected the state of Peru to the rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Peru formally recognized the jurisdiction and binding-nature of this court in 1981. In Barrios Altos v. Peru (2001) and La Cantuta v. Peru (2006), the IACtHR held that Peru’s amnesty laws were not consistent with international obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights, affirming that survivors of crimes against humanity must have guaranteed access to justice. These guarantees to legal remedy are enshrined in documents like Articles 8 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Barrios Altos v. Perú and La Cantuta v. Perú were both cases of state-sponsored massacres that lacked any legal initiation by the state because of the amnesty laws that Fujimori had put in place at this time. When the IACtHR found the state of Peru responsible in these cases, it ordered Peru to fulfill its Inter-American Convention responsibilities by investigating, prosecuting, and punishing the human rights violations that occurred, an obligation fundamentally at odds with the purpose of amnesty laws. Based on this reasoning in Barrios Altos v. Perú, the IACtHR went beyond its normal phrasing and declared Peru’s previous amnesty law null and void. Thus, Peru’s revival of impunity laws flouts both the binding rulings of the IACtHR and the treaties it has ratified.

Even without consideration of international law, Peru’s amnesty laws obstruct the pursuit of justice according to the Peruvian Constitution. Most notably, Article 44 states that one of the primary duties of the government of Peru is “to guarantee full enjoyment of human rights” and Article 138(3) guarantees the right to due process and effective jurisdictional protection, saying that, “No person shall be diverted from the jurisdiction predetermined by the law”. By granting impunity to those who have committed the most offensive human rights violations, the law discards fundamental constitutional rights and the necessity for legal remedy. By ignoring these democratic rights, amnesty laws make exceptions for those operating within oppressive governmental systems, which threatens the stable functioning of democracy. Furthermore, democratic institutions hold most fundamentally that no one person is above the law. By withholding accountability according to the law, amnesty laws pose a threat to the legitimacy of its foundations. If there are some who are above the law, then this implies that there are some who are not considered important enough for its protection. 

Critiques of such a position against amnesty laws and other forms of disregard for international standards almost always focus on the issue of state sovereignty and its conflict with international law Yet Peru has voluntarily bound itself to many of the very principles it now violates. As previously mentioned, Peru willingly subjected itself to binding treaties like the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the American Convention on Human Rights. In particular, in signing the American Convention on Human Rights, Peru agreed to respect and abide by the rulings of the IACtHR, which is further legitimized by its recognition of legitimate jurisdiction of the IACtHR in 1981, the integration of ratified treaties into national law in Peru based on its constitution, and the overturning of Law No. 26479 in the early 2000s. 

Furthermore, from a practical perspective, the passage of amnesty laws could be seen by many as a way to maintain a fragile peace during a governmental transition while opening criminal prosecutions could be seen as inadequate based on the amount of time that has passed or viewed as replaceable of or merely supplementary to the final report of the Peruvian Truth Commission in 2003. In all of these cases, survivors’ right to legal remedy remains, which is recognized in international law. While there are limitations on what is practically feasible during a state of political instability, survivors of state-sponsored violence are entitled to justice even if some choose not to pursue it. It is not healthy democratically or morally to substitute long-term foundations for short-term political stability at the expense of human rights and the rule of law. 

Argentina’s long struggle for state accountability illustrates this point. After initiating military prosecutions, Argentina later passed impunity laws for violence committed by the military in 1986 and 1987 to the outrage of social movements like Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Yet the annulment of these laws by Argentina’s Congress in 2003 and its Supreme Court in 2005 strengthened democratic values such as accountability, even though the country still faces significant democratic challenges. Additionally, while the reports of the Peruvian Truth Commission were essential in legitimizing the experience of victims and establishing a record of violence, it also serves as a roadmap for other actions that should take place. Truth commissions, criminal prosecutions, reparations, and institutional reforms are remedies owed to victims as a matter of right; they also serve as guarantees of non-repetition and lend legitimacy to transitional governments. While each of these transitional justice mechanisms should work in tandem with each other, each tool has a fundamental role. The role of allowing criminal prosecutions, even if limited to high-ranking officials, reaffirms the right of survivors of human rights violations to legal remedy, acknowledge state-sponsored violence, reestablish moral order, and assert legitimizing democratic values in which impartial rule of law prevails.

In this light, Peruvian laws like Law No. 32107 and the recently passed Law No. 32419 violate international and domestic law while failing to provide the accountability that victims of state-sponsored violence and crimes against humanity are owed. The implications of these laws go far beyond the borders of Peru. They serve as a challenge to the rule of international law, recognition of human rights, and legal accountability that provides victim-centered justice. The way that Peru and the international community respond could have profound consequences on what international law tolerates and the models that we use to remedy state-sponsored injustices for current and future governments. 


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