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The Puzzle of Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Preemption in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta

Carolina Pardo

VOLUME 3

ISSUE 2

Fall 2024

  1. Introduction

In his concurring opinion in United States v. Lara (2004), Justice Thomas writes, “Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic.”1 Justice Thomas aptly characterized Federal Indian law as contradictory and inconsistent. Since Christopher Columbus stepped on the sands of the Bahamas in 1492, the relationship between Indigenous people and Western settlers has been ever-changing and volatile. In United States jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent over the past 200 years in its understanding of tribal sovereignty, often flip-flopping back and forth on whether or not tribal land is a sovereign entity or simply a territory belonging to the U.S. government.2 Indian law presents us with a puzzling question: How do we understand the powers of a sovereign tribal nation existing within a sovereign state existing within a sovereign country?3 

Indian law issues range from child welfare cases to the ownership of natural resources. However, the first task in every Indian law case is determining who has the authority to hold the trial. Seemingly straightforward, this fundamental question lies at the heart of all issues underpinning Indian law- sovereignty. Determining who holds jurisdictional power to try crimes committed within Indian country does much more than deciding which court a case will be sent to.4 The power dynamic between tribal, federal, and state governments depends on who holds the jurisdictional authority over Indian territory.5 

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta put this dilemma at the forefront of Indian law in 2022. The Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-4 majority opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, that the state of Oklahoma shares criminal jurisdiction with the federal government for crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians on reservation land.6 The decision that Oklahoma possesses concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indian on Indian crime sent shock waves throughout Indian country, as it significantly departs from a Supreme Court decision only two years prior. McGirt v. Oklahoma ruled that the federal government preempts, or trumps, state jurisdiction on Indian reservations unless the federal government explicitly grants the state concurrent jurisdiction. 7

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta turns this ruling on its head, stating that state concurrent jurisdiction should be presumed and only preempted when the federal explicitly denies the state jurisdiction. Although jurisdictional analysis is at the center of tribal law, there is a gap in legal scholarship in analyzing the doctrine of preemption in conjunction with tribal sovereignty. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta deserves a closer look to understand how multiple sovereigns coexist in one judicial system. 

Using Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta as a case study to analyze the doctrine of preemption in Indian law, I argue that Justice Kavanaugh is wrong in asserting that the Supreme Court has consistently and explicitly presumed State jurisdiction over Indian land unless the federal government denies concurrent jurisdiction. Justice Kavanaugh’s incorrect generalization of Indian law precedent greatly weakens his argument that in preemption analysis for Indian law cases, state jurisdiction should be assumed. I will begin by defining key terms and concepts essential to understanding Indian law and the issues in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. Then, I will present the facts and procedural history of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. Then, I will critique Justice Kavanaugh’s application of preemption by highlighting the inconsistencies within Indian law precedent.  

  1. Jurisdiction and the Doctrine of Preemption 

The doctrine of preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause from Article VI of the Constitution, which asserts that federal law is the “supreme law of the land.”8 Preemption is the idea that federal law supersedes conflicting state laws.9 The Congressional Research Service defines two types of federal preemption in the article “Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer.” The federal government can expressly preempt state law when a federal law contains explicit preemptive language, or the federal government can implicitly preempt state law when Congress implicitly intends the federal statute to preempt state law.10 

The doctrine of preemption operates uniquely for Indian law cases however. In Federal Preemption: A Roadmap for the Application of Tribal Law in State Courts, Jackie Gardina highlights how preemption analysis within Indian law differs from ordinary application of the doctrine of preemption. Gardina writes that “Ordinarily, state law is presumed to apply unless it is established that Congress intended to preempt state law. The opposite presumption is at work in Indian law; state jurisdiction in Indian Country is presumed lacking.”11 To support her claim, Gardina points to the 1980 Supreme Court case White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, quoting Justice Marshall as writing “The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law.” 12

Since Federal Indian law is contradictory and inconsistent in its precedent, Justice Marshall argues that applying the doctrine of preemption to tribal sovereignty as one does to states is not wise. Tribal sovereignty is a unique class of sovereignty distinct from state sovereignty, and the application of preemption should reflect that distinction. However, in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, Justice Kavanaugh turns a blind eye to the special need of tribal law analysis and wrongly interprets the doctrine of preemption.

  1. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta and McGirt v. Oklahoma 

 An overview of McGrit v. Oklahoma provides necessary context for the discussion of concurrent jurisdiction in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. Jimcy McGirt is a Muscogee Creek citizen charged by the State of Oklahoma in 1997 for committing sex crimes against a child on the Seminole reservation. McGirt appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma courts, arguing that the state lacked jurisdiction to try him under the Major Crimes Act of 1885. The Major Crimes Act states that13:

“Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming…felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery… within the Indian country shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”

McGirt argued that since he was an Indian who committed a crime enumerated in the Major Crimes act within Indian country, Oklahoma lacked the jurisdiction to try him since the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute him.14 Justice Gorsuch, who authored the majority opinion, argues that the first question to be answered  is whether or not the crime was committed within Indian country. Once that decision was made, it could be determined if the Major Crimes Act applies.15

 Gorsuch concludes that the crime was committed on the Creek reservation, so the federal government has the exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute crimes as defined by the Major Crimes Act committed within Indian country. A treaty in 1866 between the federal government and Creek Nation recognized the existence of sovereign Creek land in what is now Eastern Oklahoma. Article I, Section II of the United States Constitution vests the power to create treaties in Congress. Gorsuch argues that “once a federal reservation is established, only Congress can diminish or disestablish it. Doing so requires a clear expression of congressional intent.”16 Despite the fact that Oklahoma has historically not recognized the existence of the Creek reservation, that does not mean it does not exist. Gorsuch concludes his opinion by writing that “unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law.” 17

Chief Justice Roberts, in the dissenting opinion, argues that the Seminole reservation does not exist because Congress and the state of Oklahoma have not treated the land as Indian territory since Oklahoma was admitted to the union.18 Chief Justice Roberts critiqued Gorsuch’s narrow analysis of the existence of the Creek reservation, arguing that a broader view of the issue demonstrates that the reservation was inoperable and not in existence at the time McGirt committed his crimes. 

Following McGirt, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the existence of several other Indian reservations in Eastern Oklahoma, classifying Tulsa as existing within Indian country. The ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma greatly impacted Castro-Huerta and McGirt v. Oklahoma, as Victor Manuel Castor-Huerta’s appeal was pending in state court when the Supreme Court decided McGirt. In 2015, Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta lived with his wife and several children in Tulsa, Oklahoma, including his then five-year-old stepdaughter.19 Castro-Huerta is non-Indian, but his stepdaughter is a member of the Cherokee Nation. The five-year-old girl also has cerebral palsy and is legally blind.20 Castro-Huerta’s sister-in-law visited the home one day in 2015, and she found the young girl sick and immediately called 911. Castro-Huerta’s step daughter was examined at a Tulsa hospital, and as Justice Kavanaugh describes her as  “dehydrated, emancipated, and covered in lice and excrement, she weighed only 19 pounds. Investigators later found her bed filled with bed bugs and cockroaches.”21 Castro-Huerta admitted to Tulsa law enforcement that he had neglected to care for his step-daughter in the preceding month, and both he and his wife were criminally charged with child neglect. Both parties were found guilty by the State of Oklahoma, and Castro-Huerta was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment with the possibility of parole. 22

While Castor-Huerta’s appeal was pending in state court, the Supreme Court decided McGirt v. Oklahoma. Following McGirt, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the existence of several other Indian reservations in Eastern Oklahoma, classifying Tulsa as existing within Indian country. Relying on McGirt, Castro-Huerta argued that the federal government has the exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with Castro-Huerta, relying on an earlier Oklahoma decision that the General Crimes Act of 1817 grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction.23 The General Crimes Act states that24:

“The general laws of the United States as to the punishment of crimes committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, … extend to the Indian country.”

The General Crimes Act grants federal jurisdiction for crimes committed on reservation land where either the perpetrator or victim is Indian. Still, it does not extend to Indian on Indian crime. In contrast, the Major Crimes Act grants federal jurisdiction to crimes committed on Indian land by an Indian, either against another Indian or a non-Indian person.

Castro-Huerta’s state conviction was vacated, and a federal grand jury indicted him for the same crime. He accepted a plea agreement to serve 7 years in prison and then leave the United States, receiving a 28-year sentence reduction.25 The state of Oklahoma appealed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruling, eventually reaching the Supreme Court in 2022.

The state of Oklahoma asked the Court to revisit McGirt v. Oklahoma and overturn the decision, which the Court refused to do. In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Oklahoma and the federal government share jurisdiction for non-Indian on Indian crime in Indian country. Since Oklahoma had the authority to prosecute Castro-Huerta, his original sentence of 35 years of prison with the possibility of parole is upheld. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Barret joined.

  1. The Court’s Misapplication of the Doctrine of Preemption

The Supreme Court incorrectly applied the doctrine of preemption to Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta by ruling that state jurisdiction should be assumed, and the burden is upon the federal government to explicitly preempt state jurisdiction. In the majority opinion, Justice Kavanaugh argues that Supreme Court precedent establishes that Indian reservations in Eastern Oklahoma are a part of the state of Oklahoma, and the Court should assume state jurisdiction unless the federal government explicitly preempts it. He writes: “To be sure, under this Court’s precedents, federal law may preempt that state jurisdiction in certain circumstances. But otherwise, as a matter of state sovereignty, a State has jurisdiction over all of its territory, including Indian country.”26 Justice Kavanaugh finds no explicit preemptive language in the General Crimes Act that preempts state jurisdiction in this case. Since there lacks convincing evidence to overturn the assumption that Oklahoma has concurrent jurisdiction, Oklahoma is not preempted by the federal government. Thus Oklahoma lawfully prosecuted Castro-Huerta.

Justice Kavanaugh begins his argument by establishing that Indian country is not a sovereign entity separate from the state. He cites various cases as precedent that Indian reservations are not sovereign, but territory belonging to the state in which it resides. Beginning at the birth of federal Indian law, Kavanaugh acknowledges the Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia (1832).27 These three Supreme Court decisions from the Chief Justice John Marshall court established that tribes are considered sovereign nations, and the federal government has a special responsibility to protect Indians and their land. 28

Justice Kavanaugh specifically acknowledges that in Worcester v. Georgia, the Court ruled that “Georgia state law had no force in the Cherokee Nation because the Cherokee Nation ‘is a distinct community occupying its own territory.’”29 However, Justice Kavanaugh argues that the precedent set by Worcester v. Georgia that tribes are sovereign nations is obsolete. He cites a 1962 case Organized Village of Kake v. Egan as stating “By 1880 the Court no longer viewed reservations as distinct nations.” 30

Justice Kavanaugh can not cherry-pick which precedent to ignore and which to follow. Repeating Justice Gorsuch in McGirt, “unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law.”31 Why are we to ignore the foundational precedent of Worcester v. Georgia and adopt the wrongful precedent established by Organized Village of Kake v. Egan? Justice Kavanaugh can reply and argue that for consistency and continuity in Indian law, the best practice is to follow stare decisis and uphold the more established precedent. Yet, Justice Kavanaugh would be contradicting himself on this front. The most recent precedent set by the Supreme Court regarding state jurisdiction in Indian country is McGirt, which was decided only two years prior to Castro-Huerta. McGirt establishes that tribes are sovereign nations, not territories belonging to the state. Thus Justice Kavanaugh should follow the most recent precedent and respect tribal sovereignty.

Justice Kavanaugh continues to make the stronger claim that “Since the latter half of the 1800s, the Court has consistently and explicitly held that Indian reservations are ‘subject to the State’s jurisdiction ‘except as forbidden by federal law,’” continuing to cite Organized Village of Kake v. Egan. (Author’s own emphasis).32 Justice Kavanaugh’s  claim that the Supreme Court has consistently and explicitly presumed state jurisdiction during preemption analysis is simply not true. With the inconsistencies within Indian law precedent, I am shocked anyone with a legal background would make such a bold and blanket statement.  Highlighting how Justice Kavanaugh’s claim departs from current Indian law, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers writes the exact opposite in their amicus curiae brief in support of Castro-Huerta: “A longstanding principle of Indian law holds that a State lacks jurisdiction over crimes involving Indians in Indian country unless Congress clearly says otherwise.”33

To support his bold assertion, Justice Kavanaugh cites several cases which hold that state jurisdiction over Indian country should be presumed unless explicitly preempted, including New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin (1946), County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation (1992), and Nevada v. Hicks (2001).34 For every case Justice Kavanaugh employs to establish the precedent of presuming state jurisdiction, a Supreme Court case decided around the same time exists, which establishes the opposite. In chronological order, Justice Kavanaugh begins with quoting New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin states: “[I]n the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or Congressional enactment each state ha[s] a right to exercise jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries.”35 However, in the same year, the Supreme Court stated the exact opposite in Williams v. United States. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers quotes Williams v. United States in their brief to the Supreme Court as stating: “The laws and courts of the United States, rather than those of Arizona, have jurisdiction over offenses committed there…by one who is not an Indian against one who is an Indian.” 36

While New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin supports Justice Kavanaugh’s choice to assume Oklahoma has concurrent jurisdiction in the case; Williams v. United States does the exact opposite in ruling that the United States government, as opposed to state governments, has exclusive jurisdiction. If forced to choose which precedent to follow in deciding Castro-Huerta, one should choose the latter. While New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin applies to non-Indian on non-Indian crime, Williams v. United States explicitly states that non-Indian on Indian crime falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. Castro-Huerta is a non-Indian who committed a crime against his Cherokee step-daughter, so Williams v. United States is a more appropriate controlling precedent to adopt. 

Second, Justice Kavanaugh jumps from 1946 to 1992 and references County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation. Justice Kavanaugh quotes the case in his majority opinion: “This Court’s more recent cases have recognized the rights of States, absent a congressional prohibition, to exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over non-Indians located on reservation lands.”37 However, Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinion for County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, neglects to address a case decided only 13 years prior, which preempts state jurisdiction. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers cites the 1979 case Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation to support their argument that the Court presumes the state lacks jurisdiction. In the amicus brief, Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation is quoted as stating: “As a practical matter, this has meant that criminal offenses by or against Indians have been subject only to federal or tribal laws… except where Congress, in the exercise of its plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs, has ‘expressly provided that State laws shall apply.’”38 These two quotes from County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation and Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation claim exactly opposite ideas. While the former supports Justice Kavanaugh’s view that we should presume state jurisdiction, the latter supports Justice Gorsuch’s view that state jurisdiction should be assumed to be preempted. It seems the Supreme Court is incapable of deciding how to apply preemption to Indian law. 

Justice Kavanaugh concludes his listing of supposedly supporting precedent with Nevada v. Hicks. Justice Kavanaugh quotes the 2001 decision:  “State sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border.”39 Yet, as previously argued, McGirt v. Oklahoma is the most recent precedent. As the Supreme Court continuously flips back and forth with their application of the doctrine of preemption to Indian law, Justice Kavanaugh picks moments when the Court happened to rule in his favor. However, just as many cases can be cited as supporting the opposite. Clearly, there is no consistency on if the Court presumes state jurisdiction. Thus Justice Kavanugh wrongly asserts that “Since the latter half of the 1800s, the Court has consistently and explicitly held that Indian reservations are ‘subject to the State’s jurisdiction ‘except as forbidden by federal law.’”40

  1. Concluding Thoughts 

Justice Gorsuch writes in his dissenting opinion in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta: “Tribes are not private organizations within state boundaries. Their reservations are not glorified private campgrounds. Tribes are sovereigns. And the preemption rule applicable to them is exactly the opposite of the normal rule.”41 The doctrine of preemption applies  to many different types of law, but Indian law exists apart from the whole. Indian law is unconventional, unpredictable, and inconsistent. It deserves a special class of analysis, or else inconsistencies continue, at the detriment of all Native Americans. Justice Kavanaugh’s treatment of Indian law cases as ordinary resulted in an extraordinary decision that uprooted the understanding of tribal sovereignty established two years prior. Indian law deserves our special attention, and it is unfortunate and demoralizing to see our Nation’s leading legal figures misunderstand how tribal sovereignty operates. However, the recent string of high profile Indian law cases has sparked conversations about Native American rights. Hopefully the legal puzzles of tribal sovereignty are not forgotten about or disregarded by legal scholars, as Native Americans have been forgotten about for long enough. 

Notes

  1. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, (2004). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/541/193/.  ↩︎
  2.  Elizabeth Reese, “Affirmation of inherent tribal power to police blurs civil and criminal Indian law tests,” SCOTUS Blog, last modified June 7, 2021, https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/affirmation-of-inherent-tribal-power-to-police-blurs-civil-and-criminal-indian-law-tests/#:~:text=When%20asked%20to%20determine%20which,made%20it%20into%20this%20opinion.  ↩︎
  3. Within federal law, the term used to classify people belonging to a tribe existing within the borders of the United States is “Indian.” The term “Indian” is outdated and offensive to many Native Americans today; as a Native American woman myself I am aware of the colonial underpinnings of the term. However, since it is the term used in federal law and Supreme Court cases, I will be using it throughout this paper. Additionally, I will be using the term “Indian” and “Native American” interchangeably. ↩︎
  4. 18 U.S. Code § 1151 defines Indian country “as all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government.” ↩︎
  5. Throughout this paper the term “jurisdiction” will be exclusively referencing criminal jurisdiction, meaning all cases I will be discussing and referencing will be criminal cases as opposed to civil. Thus my argument only applies to the limited scope of criminal jurisdiction. Further analysis of civil cases is warranted for a future endeavor. ↩︎
  6. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  7. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 18, (2020). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-9526/.  ↩︎
  8.  U.S. Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2. ↩︎
  9. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer, by Jay B. Sykes and Nicole Vanatko, RL45825 (2019), 1. ↩︎
  10.  U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer, by Jay B. Sykes and Nicole Vanatko, RL45825 (2019), 1. ↩︎
  11. Jackie Gardina, Federal Preemption: A Roadmap for the Application of Tribal Law in State Courts, 35 American Indian L. Rev. 1, 33 (2010). ↩︎
  12. Jackie Gardina, Federal Preemption: A Roadmap for the Application of Tribal Law in State Courts, 35 American Indian L. Rev. 1, 33 (2010). ↩︎
  13. Major Crimes Act, U.S. Code 18 (1885), § 1153. ↩︎
  14. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 18, (2020). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-9526/.  ↩︎
  15. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 18, (2020). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-9526/.  ↩︎
  16. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 18, (2020). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-9526/.  ↩︎
  17. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 18, (2020). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-9526/. ↩︎
  18.  McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 18, (2020). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-9526/.  ↩︎
  19. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  20. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  21.  Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S.  21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  22. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555.  ↩︎
  23. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  24.  General Crimes Act, U.S. Code 18 (1817), § 1152. ↩︎
  25. Castro-Huerta is not a U.S. citizen and was unlawfully residing in the United States. ↩︎
  26.  Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  27.  “Marshall Trilogy,” University of Alaska Fairbanks, accessed January 24, 2025. https://www.uaf.edu/tribal/academics/112/unit-1/marshalltrilogy.php.  ↩︎
  28. “Marshall Trilogy,” University of Alaska Fairbanks, accessed January 24, 2025. https://www.uaf.edu/tribal/academics/112/unit-1/marshalltrilogy.php.  ↩︎
  29. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  30.  Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  31.  McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 18, 42, (2020). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-9526/.  ↩︎
  32. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  33. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae, p. 4, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). ↩︎
  34. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  35. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  36.  Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, (1946). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/327/711/.  ↩︎
  37.  Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  38.  Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 11, (1979). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/439/463/. ↩︎
  39.  Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  40. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎
  41. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 21 (2022). Accessed January 24, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555. ↩︎

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https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-429/#tab-opinion-4602555.

Reese, Elizabeth. “Affirmation of inherent tribal power to police blurs civil and criminal Indian law tests,” SCOTUS Blog, last modified June 7, 2021,
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/affirmation-of-inherent-tribal-power-to-police-blurs-civil-and-criminal-indian-law-tests/#:~:text=When%20asked%20to%20determine%20which,made%20it%20into%20this%20opinion.

U.S. Code 18 (1948), § 1153.

U.S. Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2.
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https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/541/193/.

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Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, (1946). Accessed January 24, 2025.
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