In 1976, voters in Alaska ratified Proposition Two in the state’s general election by over a thirty percent margin, redefining the state’s resource allocation to accommodate the then-lucrative oil development proceeds rapidly flowing into its economy.[1] Through the adoption of this referendum, residents of the State agreed to “establish a constitutional permanent fund into which at least 25 percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal mineral revenue sharing payment and bonuses received by the state would be paid.”[2] This “permanent fund” would eventually come to be distributed evenly across all residents of Alaska, forming the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend—or, more commonly, the PFD. At almost fifty years old, this Dividend is now not only the longest-standing universal cash aid program to be implemented in the United States, it also serves as the only functional universal basic income system in the world.[3]
Alaska’s Permanent Fund, though unique in practice, was born out of the State’s proactive desire to prepare for a not-so-distant future wherein its then-burgeoning economy would be significantly reduced. In 1968, oil was discovered on Alaska’s North Slope, creating a vast influx of corporate interest within the state as large corporations began to fund extraction initiatives within the Prudhoe Bay region.[4] As greater drilling endeavors began taking shape, Alaska’s economy accordingly began to balloon: in 1968, state oil revenues reached $52 million and in 1969 the state’s leasing of the North Slope region for oil development garnered a record $900 million.[5] Given that the economy’s exponential growth based on a nonrenewable fossil fuel resource would eventually plateau, Alaska realized it needed to set aside a portion of its earnings to account for periods of future stagnation. Without oil revenue, the State knew that it would need to either increase taxation or cut certain initiatives completely to ensure the continued functioning of the state government. Over time, these gradual cuts would leave some citizens of the state without their needs accounted for as programs were cut from the bottom up, over time creating a less efficient government. As Alaska’s Supreme Court would later state in the case Williams v. Zobel I, the State initially theorized that the overwhelming influx of funds might lead to a statewide overexpenditure, wherein the State would be more willing to spend on unnecessary initiatives without the burden of efficiently using taxpayer dollars. Therefore, the State also sought a solution that would keep them in check during periods of high growth.[6]
In adopting the Permanent Fund, Alaska legislators desired to create a system that would encourage continued residency within the state and allow citizens to reap the rewards of Alaska’s natural resources. As Alaska’s oil and natural gas reserves that fund the PFD are in limited supply, the development of a multibillion-dollar Fund to capture a portion of the State’s revenues with an annual payout to citizens based on the Fund’s interest is meant to provide benefits to future generations of Alaskans even while natural resource extraction causes the initial source of Alaska’s economic prosperity depletes.[7] Over the forty-nine years of its lifespan so far, the PFD has been responsible for significant sociopolitical change—as of 2024, around 81% of all Alaskans believe the PFD improves the quality of their lives despite the relatively minimal amount of the payout in comparison to the average yearly income in the State.[8] Further, this non-means tested method of allocating income to citizens has improved the quality of life of certain systemically disadvantaged social groups; for example, the PFD has contributed to poverty reductions in Alaska Native communities and for more elderly residents.[9]
Since the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent recessions, the notion of universal basic income systems has gained traction around the world as potentially viable forms of social assistance, wherein the bureaucracy of receiving benefits is reduced and aid recipients are free to use their benefits however they see fit. In 2020, United States presidential candidate Andrew Yang capitalized on these benefits as a major component for his campaign for the Democratic ticket, calling his UBI proposal the “Freedom Dividend”—a $1,000 monthly payment provided to all Americans over the age of 18, regardless of work status.[10] That same year, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signaled the potential global utility of UBI proposals in reducing the dramatic regional effects of income stratification in its call for the implementation of UBI across the Pacific Asia region to provide supplemental income for families facing poverty.[11]Despite the continuity of Alaska’s PFD, UBI trials have been ongoing on recent years; since 2018, NGO GiveDirectly has operated a basic income trial system in Kenya, wherein a select group of 195 villages in the nation’s Siaya and Bomet counties will receive varying levels of monthly payments to determine the effects of basic income in areas facing extreme poverty[12], with goals of expanding basic income initiatives across the world in the future.[13] Around the world, in developed and developing countries and regions, basic income proposals have made great strides in popularity over the last ten years as extreme poverty and economic disparity continues to pose challenges to marginalized groups. As UBI continues to become a more popular solution, it is worth turning to the only functioning global UBI plan to discover how Alaska’s model has thus far withstood the test of time and to determine whether or not it is replicable elsewhere.
In specific, this paper will first analyze the legal origins of Alaska’s PFD and dissect the unique caselaw it has brought on both federal and state circuits. In doing so, I will highlight how the state’s one-of-a-kind income initiative carved itself into the Alaska State Constitution to serve the state population’s unique needs, based on the localized profit sources that were available to it during its inception. Using this analysis, I will finally analyze whether the requirements placed on the PFD from American legal constructs open paths toward its future replicability on a national or global scale, or whether UBI as a proposal is doomed to die out in Alaska.
Alaska’s Development of the PFD
In April 1980, four years after Alaskan voters permitted the State to establish a Permanent Fund, the Alaskan legislature passed Alaska Statutes 43.23.010–.100, setting up the initial structure of the Dividend.[14] In this initial structure, half of Alaska’s Permanent Fund account was ordered to be set aside yearly to be distributed in unequal dividends to Alaska residents. For every year of residency, Alaskans would receive a dividend of “at least fifty dollars” so that as a resident grew older, their share of the Permanent Fund would increase.[15] These initial requirements for receiving the PFD were extremely convoluted and unclear, though, immediately posing issues for the disbursement of payments to individuals and the enforcement of Alaska’s then-newly adopted statutes. In particular, residency posed particular problems in this setup: while residency was ostensibly required to receive the PFD, there was no set time period during which one was required to live in the state before being considered a resident. As the Alaska Supreme Court later noted, “[t]here [was] no ‘durational residency’ requirement [in the initial proposal]; a bona fide resident of Alaska… immediately [became] eligible for a pro rata portion of his or her first dividend” regardless of time spent in the state.[16]Conflicting with this qualification, though, initial statutes also declared Alaskans would become eligible for additional dividends after further full years of residency following Alaska’s statehood in 1959, which conflicted with the lack of durational residency requirement. In 1980, the same year Alaska enumerated its initial conditions for the PFD, Ronald and Patricia Zobel—two lawyers that had been Alaska residents since 1978—filed suit against Thomas Williams, the Commissioner of Revenue of Alaska, alleging Alaska’s unclear residency requirements for its initial PFD requirements violated the Equal Protection Clauses of Alaska and the U.S.’ Constitutions.[17] Following a lower court ruling siding with the Zobels, the case made its way to the Alaska Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court. This paper will analyze the cases brought at both levels to understand the differences in legal analysis both courts came to in analyzing the residency requirements and payment structures that one state could legally mandate as part of a universal basic income system.
At the state level, the Alaska Supreme Court’s first impasse in the case of Williams v. Zobel II before reaching any substantive concern regarding the feasibility of universal basic income was to determine which standard of scrutiny was appropriate to apply to the residency requirement imposed by the State of Alaska for receiving payments. Prior to Williams, the Alaska Court relied predominantly on the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrine adopted in Dunn v. Blumstein. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court stipulated that “[a]n appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny.”[18] Interpreting this statement, the Alaska Court found that, as residency requirements tended to restrict the movement of individuals across state boundaries so residents could keep their state-provided benefits, the right of American citizens to unrestricted interstate travel was violated upon the implementation of residency requirements.[19] Given this clear violation, the Court viewed strict scrutiny—a method of review wherein specific “requirements” are viewed as “prima facie invalid and will be countenanced only when they serve a compelling state interest”—as necessary to determine whether the State of Alaska could justify the necessity of its residency requirements within the context of providing a basic income to its citizens.[20] Though the State of Alaska had operated under this strict interpretation, it did note that the federal government had not obliged them explicitly to do so and had in fact declined to use strict scrutiny in many cases similar to Williams v. Zobel II; for instance, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s consideration of Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County and Sosna v. Iowa, strict scrutiny was not used in cases regarding residency requirements for reimbursements of medical care and for filing divorce cases.[21] Alaska, however, declined to separate from the strict scrutiny standard as the federal court had, noting that the replacement rational basis standard—wherein a “statute or ordinance must have a legitimate state interest, and there [need only] be a rational connection between the statute’s/ordinance’s means and goals”[22]—“would give insufficient weight to the important right involved.”[23] Following a 1978 Alaska case regarding the state classification of cocaine—State v. Erickson—the Court adopted a new “uniform balancing approach”[24] based on their desire to create “a more flexible, less result-oriented analysis” in situations “[w]here fundamental rights or suspect categories are involved.”[25] As described in Williams v. Zobel I (a previous case between the same parties in the Alaska Supreme Court regarding the State’s then-existing income tax exemptions as well as the constitutionality of the PFD), this approach entails the following steps:
Initially, we must look to the purpose of the statute, viewing the legislation as a whole, and the circumstances surrounding it. It must be determined that this purpose is legitimate, that it falls within the police power of the state. Examining the means used to accomplish the legislative objectives and the reasons advanced therefore, the court must then determine whether the means chosen substantially further the goals of the enactment. Finally, the state interest in the chosen means must be balanced against the nature of the constitutional right involved.[26]
By relying on this new standard, the Alaska Supreme Court found itself better able to balance the intent of Alaska’s legislation against its actual effects on residents without having to automatically regard Alaska’s residency requirement as unconstitutional and require the State to prove otherwise (as would be necessitated in strict scrutiny).[27]
Though the Alaska Supreme Court’s argument countering the equal protection concerns brought by the Zobels would come to be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Alaska Court’s interpretation of the constitutional right to interstate migration proves as an interesting analysis of universal income initiatives and the differing justifications for and against their implementation. In Williams II, the Alaska Court drew attention to its perception that the initial plan for the PFD seemed to actually favor newer residents to the state rather than older residents, despite the fact that longer residents would (by virtue of the PFD’s formula) earn more every year than their newer counterparts. Take, for example, two residents of Alaska—one who has resided in the state their whole life and recently reached the age of majority, and the other who is also eighteen but only just completed their first year in the state. Upon the PFD’s implementation, the first resident would receive eighteen dividends—one for every year of their life—while the other would get only one. Sixteen years later, the first resident would still be outearning the second, receiving 34 dividends while the other only gets 17. Here, though, the Court notes that, beyond this point, the second resident’s earning potential matches that of the first, insofar as they are able to earn the same amount of dividends as the first person had upon the PFD’s implementation. On the contrary, the first resident will never be able to earn the second resident’s first seventeen years of dividends, as the PFD would only become effective upon the age of majority and the number of dividends a resident would receive would match only the number of years they would receive in the state. Should the first resident then choose to leave Alaska in his 35th year of residency, the second resident over the next eighteen years would continue to earn their share of dividends, eventually matching those the first resident received before leaving the state. In the end, after both recipients reach the age of 53, the newer resident has earned a greater share of the PFD than the recipient who was born in the state, even while both recipients had resided outside of Alaska for the same length of time.[28] In this sense, the Court argued—somewhat paradoxically—that Alaska’s initial PFD proposal actually incentivized people to move to the state instead of creating a barrier that disincentivized residents from ever leaving the state. As the Court notes in Williams II (internal citations omitted):
Examination of the nature and extent of the infringement of the constitutional right involved has led us to conclude that this legislative scheme cannot be said to “penalize” the right of interstate migration. In commonsense terms, it is easy to see that the imposition of a tax primarily on new residents, with older residents exempt, can be perceived as a penalty imposed on a person who chooses to exercise his or her right to move into Alaska. It is much more difficult to perceive such a “penalty” here. The new resident does, in fact, receive financial gain for exercising his or her right to move into Alaska; and whatever “penalty” may accrue from the fact that this gain is not as large as that realized by a long-term resident we regard as de minimis.[29]
Ultimately, though, the U.S. Supreme Court declined this logic, arguing instead that, in any instance “[w]hen a state distributes benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and generally a law will survive that scrutiny if the distinctions rationally further a legitimate state purpose.”[30] The Supreme Court determined that it was mistaken to consider Alaska to have a legitimate purpose in implementing its PFD policy by encouraging nonresidents to move to the State to reap the rewards of an unequal earning system that would hypothetically permit them more money only if they were to outlive any lifelong resident. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court did not find it compelling that lifelong Alaskans could earn more through the PFD rather than newer residents, and did not give merit to the claim that the higher dividend amount designed to “reward[] citizens for [their] past contributions” was a legitimate state purpose under the Equal Protection Clause.[31] The basis for this ruling was taken from the U.S. Supreme Court case Shapiro v. Thompson, wherein Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia’s yearlong-residency requirement prior to receiving welfare was struck down.[32] In this case, the defending governments used the reasoning that older residents in a state had contributed more to the state’s economy and in state taxes than newer residents, and thus were more deserving of state aid than newer residents.[33] Indeed, the Court identified a slippery slope that was created when this logic was allowed to pass; one which could bar newer residents from accessing any and all services funded by taxpayers—including public schools, fire departments, police protection, and recreational facilities.[34] As the Equal Protection Clause forbids such barriers to essential public services, it does not make sense that the State of Alaska should be permitted to grant certain taxpayers certain advantages that others cannot receive.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Zobel v. Williams, the State of Alaska revamped the existing PFD system to remain in compliance with the Court’s decision. Specifically, the new system requires the State of Alaska to set aside 50% of its annual net income into the Permanent Fund account[35], after which 21% of the Permanent Fund’s and State’s earnings reserve’s growth[36] is more or less evenly divided by the number of residents of the state so equal dividends can be distributed to residents.[37] This system, though it has been swayed by politicization,[38] has been followed ever since, with PFD amounts ranging yearly from around $1000—$3000.[39] Alongside the State’s continued ability to be able to provide equal annual disbursements to residents, the Alaska Permanent Fund account has also seen significant return on investment, starting from just $54.5 million in 1978 and growing to an estimated $81.3 billion in early 2025.[40] This growth of around 1451 times its initial value over just fifty years represents the State’s longstanding implementation of a surplus revenue fund augmented by interest received from investment of the Fund in stocks, bonds, real estate, and other revenue sources.[41]
Despite the incredible growth of the Permanent Fund in under fifty years, Alaska has in recent years still undergone significant financial strain as a result of its refusal to use the Permanent Fund outside of the PFD. As a result, the Alaska Supreme Court was required to intervene in 2016 to reevaluate the legal standing of the Permanent Fund against competing arguments which sought to either restrict its dedication to the Alaska Legislature or to open up its funds as a sort of general appropriations bill which could be influenced by state executive powers. In that year, though Alaska’s legislature calculated the yearly PFD amount pursuant to the formula established within the state’s statutes, the State Governor vetoed half of the funds set aside due to its high cost in the State budget.[42] After Alaska’s legislature failed to override this veto, three members of the legislature sued the governor, arguing the wording of the 1976 constitutional amendments adopted by voters permitted only the State legislature to pass laws on the distribution of funds for the PFD and did not allow executive interference.[43] Following a ruling in favor of the Governor, the legislators—led by Alaska Democrat Bill Wielechowski—appealed, forming the Alaska Supreme Court case Wielechowski v. Alaska.[44]
Since 1982, the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend income has been placed in an earnings reserve account managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund Divident Corporation.[45] Prior to Wielechowski, every year after 1982, Alaska’s legislature specifically issued an appropriation for the deposit of these funds to avoid any potential conflict with the State Constitution’s anti-dedication clause.[46] Without incident, these appropriations were never rejected at the State level and, pursuant to the adopted formulas, PFDs were yearly distributed to residents. In 2016, however, this formula mandated that $1.362 billion in State funds needed to be transferred from the earnings reserve to the PFD,[47] which would have allocated a relatively high $2,052 per Alaska citizen.[48] That May, then-Alaska Governor Bill Walker vetoed this allocation, due to the increasing debt the state was subject to the time—then around $5.7 billion—as well as the diminishing oil prospects for the state that financed the PFD.[49] In order to guide the State out of financial ruin, Gov. Walker’s political platform operated under the theory that the State could use its then-$54 billion Permanent Fund account to offset a portion of its debt by financing certain governmental programs,[50] as the reserved funds were initially developed to offset the assured later economic downturn of Alaska following the plateau and crash of oil investment. In vetoing the legislative appropriation, Walker counterproposed a $695.65 million transfer that would have lowered divided amounts by approximately half.[51] At the time, this decision was regarded with nuance across party lines, with many Democratic and Republican political officials noting that the only sustainable way to support Alaska’s changing economy was to transfer money from the Permanent Fund—while also realizing that the public sentiment around the PFD forced the State to continue to offer it to residents even when it wasn’t economically feasible.[52] Protesting Walker’s proposal, Bill Wielechowski, alongside two former Republican state legislators Rick Halford and Clem Tillion, filed suit against Walker and the State of Alaska, claiming that the Alaska Constitution had not allowed the executive branch to interfere with the State Legislature’s allocation of funds. The legislators also argued that, in adopting the PFD, Alaska’s residents did not intend for it to fall under the State Constitution’s anti-dedication clause, which explicitly was amended in 1976 to read (emphasis added):
The proceeds of any state tax or license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose, except as provided in section 15 of this article or when required by the federal government for state participation in federal programs. This provision shall not prohibit the continuance of any dedication for special purposes existing upon the date of ratification of this section by the people of Alaska.[53]
The Alaska Superior Court ruled that, despite the exemption from the anti-dedication clause, the legislature’s appropriations were generally “budgetary processes” and thus able to be vetoed.[54] On review, the Alaska Supreme Court notes that the very notion of the PFD within the State circumvents the beliefs of the writers of the Alaska Constitution, who viewed “‘the dedication of revenues’ [as] ‘a fiscal evil,’ largely because it failed ‘to preserve control of and responsibility for state spending in the legislature and the governor.’”[55] Voters, on the other hand, as well as legislators at the time of the PFD’s implementation, no longer saw this clause as being necessary due to the unprecedented volume of income entering the state, and so granted a specific exclusion to this requirement when adopting the Permanent Fund to allow financial allocations to be made for a specific purpose. The Court noted, in fact, that the dedication of the PFD to the residents of Alaska was specifically enumerated in the State’s Constitution, highlighting the State intended to create a long-term aid system for residents that couldn’t be easily changed by political whim—instead, a Constitutional amendment would have to take place in order for the policy to be reevaluated.[56]
In reviewing the disputed law of the Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on the framework it adopted in Hickel v. Cowper, wherein it stated its intention was not to interpret the intent of the Framers but instead to follow the doctrine of textualism.[57] In this decision, it appears that the Court’s framework is based on notions of principle and is not a blanket rule; in many other instances—the review of federal indigenous law and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, for example—the Alaska Supreme Court has used an originalist basis to determine the purpose of the U.S. Congress and other governing bodies in enacting legislation.[58] As the Alaska State Constitution was devised over a period of months by representatives who convened to discuss the fundamental protections endowed to state residents and was later ratified by voters across the state[59], the Alaska Supreme Court opined that the declarations of the Constitution were worded exactly as originally intended by residents of the state and, as such, the original meanings of the text are already included within its language. Similarly, the amendment to the Alaska Constitution adopting the Permanent Fund initially started as a ballot measure, and was voted in favor of by a majority of residents, leading to its adoption. The Alaska Court recognized that, in this instance, using an originalist lens could lead to “‘interpret[ing] existing constitutional language more broadly than intended by… the voters,’” due to its potential to open and expand an issue it viewed as previously settled.[60]
Next, the Court turned to the issue of dedication. In a seeming rebuke to the Court’s previous statements in favor of blanket textualism for constitutional concerns, the Court argued that the anti-dedication clause’s specific wording of “state tax or license”[61] actually applied to all State revenues earned. In doing so, the State turned to the case of State v. Alex, wherein the constitutional issue of the allocation of funds similarly made a reappearance. In this case, contrary to any form of textualism, the Alaska Court returned to territorial-era studies done by the Alaska Statehood Commission in advance of the territory’s Constitutional Convention, prepared with the explicit intention to be used by the delegates to the Convention during the drafting process. From these documents, the Court noted the basis for Alaska’s anti-dedication clause, basing their findings on the documents delegates were provided with that outlined “‘[t]he most severe obstacle to the scope and flexibility of budgeting results [was] from the earmarking or dedication of certain revenue for specified purposes or funds.’”[62] Importantly, the Statehood Commission’s studies strongly encouraged the Framers of the Alaska Constitution to prevent any dedication of funds, a decision the Court stated would amount to “an abdication of legislative responsibility.”[63] Therefore, it concluded that the notions of revenue, taxation, and funds as written in the Alaska Constitution were used in effectively the same manner, and specifically cited the initial version of the State’s anti-dedication clause in this argument: “‘[a]ll revenues shall be deposited in the state treasury without allocation for special purposes…’”[64] Therefore, the Court concludes that the current wording of the anti-dedication clause which enumerates only taxes or licenses is actually meant to include “all state revenue.”[65] In the case Sonneman v. Hickel, the Court reaffirmed this decision, stating that “‘[w]ithout earmarked funds, the constitutional framers believed that the legislature would be required to decide funding priorities annually on the merits of the various proposals presented.’”[66]
It is important to recognize here that the Alaska Supreme Court appears to have adopted two principally opposing arguments when discussing the dedication of state funds. On one hand, the Court proclaims that State constitutional questions necessitate using textual considerations, while in the very next sentence eschews that textualism for an originalist review of the State’s Constitutional Convention. In doing so, while the Court reverts back to what they believe were the Framers’ intentions for the Alaska Constitution, they ignore the original meaning of the constitution on Alaska’s residents. While the Court notes in its reasoning that the wording of the anti-dedication clause had changed over the course of the Convention for the specific reason to allow some funds to be dedicated to pay off certain state bonds, this evidence is not reflected in its current wording of the dedication clause, creating a divide between the Court’s interpretation of State revenues as encompassing generally all monetary income to the State.
To analyze the effects Alaska’s originalist distinction might have, it is crucial to analyze the two main methods of Alaska’s oil funding that contributes to the Permanent Fund. In fiscal year 2024, around half of petroleum revenue came from revenue taxes, while the other half came from leases.[67] As the slight majority of Alaska’s current method of oil funding is primarily based on a 35% revenue tax on corporations, which generated $1.3 billion for the state in 2024[68], it is clear that the these funds would still be subject to the anti-dedication clause regardless of the Court’s ruling. However, the State also generates 47.6% of its oil funds from royalties paid by oil corporations for their obligatory leases on Alaska’s North Slope, Cook Inlet, and Coastal Plain regions so that they may drill on State land.[69] Though these leases currently generate just over $1 billion for the State, historically their contribution has been significantly more pronounced—in fiscal year 2014, for example, royalties from leases earned the State of Alaska $3.1 billion so that around $27 billion worth of oil could be extracted.[70] These revenues are not clearly a “tax”—instead, they are money that must be deposited by corporations to maintain their stakes in Alaska’s oil economy. They are also not clearly a “license,” as the leases themselves do not necessarily permit corporations to do business in Alaska, they merely allow them access to specific regions to conduct their operations. In this case, it is unclear how Alaska’s oil leases fit into the anti-declaration clause, as the Alaska Supreme Court would consider them a general revenue source for the state that is being allocated for the PFD. From a purely textual lens, however, the Alaska Constitution lends credence to the notion that, though these funds were historically reserved and allocated towards Alaska’s Permanent Fund, the funds must be considered as a legislative appropriation as their existence as neither taxes nor licenses exempts them from the exception established under Article 9, § 7 of the Alaska Constitution and thus opens up their distribution to the Permanent Fund to gubernatorial veto. Therefore, a textual review would allow the governor to reject only the distribution of royalties and not revenue taxes.
Though the discrepancy between the textualist and originalist lenses exists under the Court’s analysis, a later historical review in Wielechowski demonstrates that the Court’s ultimate decision did not neglect the viewpoints of the voters when the Permanent Fund was adopted. In 1976, the notion of the Permanent Fund largely existed in a vacuum as a notion proposed by then-Governor of Alaska Jay Hammond, who wished to “set aside a modest portion of the proceeds from the exploitation of our non-renewable resources for investment in our future while leaving sufficient revenues for [the State’s] present needs.”[71] When Hammond’s proposal was sent to voters as part of Proposition Two, it was done without any mention of the later Dividend program. Instead, voters were guaranteed only that, if they voted for the Proposition, a discretionary amount of funds would be yearly set aside and used for “income-producing investments permitted by law.”[72] Further, no such “income-producing invesments” were ever identified in this Proposition before voters, nor by Gov. Hammond or the Alaska State Legislature during the Permanent Fund’s adoption.[73] The Anchorage Daily News reported on the proposed permeability the Permanent Fund would be required to take in 1976, stating (emphasis added):
Exactly how the permanent fund is set up would be the job of future legislatures. Our elected representatives, by law, would prescribe how the money is to be invested. That may demand a different application of the fund from one year to the next, but flexibility to meet changing demands is guaranteed by current legislation. Likewise, future legislators would be able to decide what to do with the considerable earnings of the fund. Perhaps that extra dividend will be needed sometimes for general operating expense; at other times, perhaps the dividends could be simply reinvested in the fund itself. The freedom to choose must be built into the fund.[74]
In the Court’s eyes, it was no question that not only did the initial conditions of the Permanent Fund required it to be malleable, the public perception of the investment was certainly as an adapting financial asset that could be tailored to the State’s financial needs at any given time. Though the difference in textual versus original interpretation still remains, the Court now makes clear that taking Wielechowski’s claims only on their face value neglects the history of the Permanent Fund in addition to the public reasoning for the adoption of the Fund. Following the Court’s explicit proof that the disputed Permanent Fund was and is not explicitly dedicated to the PFD, it thereby decided to relegate the assignment of funds to the Permanent Fund as merely another legislative appropriation the state governor has clear jurisdiction to veto. In this vein, the Court found:
We… emphasize the significance of the anti-dedication clause to the state’s budgetary framework. No party suggests that Permanent Fund income is not state revenue. Our starting point must therefore be that the anti-dedication clause prohibits the dedication of Permanent Fund income unless the 1976 constitutional amendment exempted not only the dedication of enumerated revenues into the Permanent Fund, but also—as Wielechowski argues—the legislature’s potential future, unspecified dedication of revenues out of the Permanent Fund.[75]
This statement clearly follows from the Permanent Fund’s intended purpose. As the Alaska intended for the Fund to compensate for any future losses caused by the stagnation of the oil industry, it makes sense that the State would not wish to allocate all funds to one particular purpose in favor of a more nuanced approach that considers the State’s yearly needs (as is the purpose of the anti-dedication clause). In this case, the Alaska Court further undermines the stability of the PFD—as an entity, it is merely a yearly manifestation of the Permanent Fund’s multibillion-dollar value and an effort for the State to compensate citizens for income earned the previous year. Indeed, Alaska citizens tend to view the PFD with general favor aligning with this intention: many, for example, take the PFD to be “compensation for the high cost of living [and] the hardships associated with life [in rural Alaska], or for the [state’s] high tax[ation rates].”[76] It is crucial to note, though, that though these concerns are certainly already prohibitive for Alaskans, they are minimal compared to what the eventual effects the withdrawal of Alaska’s oil economy will have on the state. With 85% of the state’s economy dependent on petroleum production, it is clear that as oil reserves are depleted, critical governmental functions will be forced to fall into disarray (if not cut altogether) absent alternate funding sources.[77] If the State was forced to continue offering the PFD indefinitely to residents, it is clear that there would be a point at which its personal utility to residents would be far outweighed by its prohibitive governmental cost which would prevent the state from taking many meaningful steps to preserve its own security. This much became clear in Wielechowski, when the near-$2 billion allocation to the Permanent Fund necessitated by the legislatively mandated formula prevented the State from paying back its accruing debt that inhibited its further development. In sum, the Court concluded that “the 1976 constitutional amendment does not allow the dedication of Permanent Fund income.”[78]
Further, the Court makes clear in its plain-language analysis the legal difference between income within the Permanent Fund and that within the Permanent Fund Dividend. In Section 15 of Article 9 of the Alaska Constitution, it is mandated that “[a]ll income from the permanent fund shall be deposited in the general fund unless otherwise provided by law.” While Wielechowski argued the language “unless otherwise provided by law” mandated the Court to consider income deposited within the Permanent Fund as income dedicated to the general fund, the Court disagreed with this notion. Instead, it found the existence of Alaska’s earnings reserve account was income outside of the general fund not dedicated to the PFD, a clear example of alternate provisions under law for Permanent Fund Income. The Court also ruled that this provision merely authorized the Legislature to deposit money in the general fund and did not mandate that all Permanent Funds were inherently dedicated to this fund.[79] As a result, the Court found that “[i]nterpreting the 1976 constitutional amendment to allow dedications of Permanent Fund income would create an anti-dedication clause exception that would swallow the rule.”[80] That is, if the Court allowed income deposited within the Permanent Fund to be blanket apportioned to the PFD, it would destroy the whole purpose of enacting an anti-dedication clause in the first place. From this decision, it is clear that, in order to establish a PFD in 2016, the Alaska Legislature had to appropriate a certain amount of the funds within the Permanent Fund to the dividend—a budgetary process the governor had complete power to overrule as the executive head of Alaska.[81]
Finally, the Court opined that Governor Walker’s veto in 2016 did not have any effect diminishing the power of the legislative, as his reduction of the yearly PFD amount did not challenge the Alaska Legislature’s ability to annually apportion funds to the dividend.[82] The Court drew comparisons to the Alaska Supreme Court case Simpson v. Murkowski here, wherein then-Governor of Alaska Frank Murkowski also used his veto power to reduce the amount of longevity bonus payments a State House bill had obligated the State to pay to senior citizens.[83] There, the Court noted that the Alaska Constitution “contemplates a role for both the governor and the legislature in the appropriations process.”[84] In specific, when the Alaska Legislature proposes a specific yearly budget for the State to follow, the Governor can subsequently issue a line-item veto on any item they personally disagree with, allowing them to “‘strike or reduce items in appropriation bills.’”[85] The Court identifies here that this expanded executive power originates from Alaska’s Constitutional Convention, when the Framers desired “‘to create a strong executive branch with “a strong control on the purse strings” of the state.’”[86] At the same time, though, the Alaska Constitution also allows for the legislature to override gubernatorial vetos with a three-fourths supermajority.[87] In Simpson, when the Alaska Governor vetoed the extension of bonus payments and the Alaska Legislature declined to overrule the veto, the Court indicated that, as the law for continuing payments was inherently an appropriations bill, the Governor had every right to veto it. If the Legislature chose not override the governor’s veto, then the Court could only consider the appropriations process to have reached completion and therefore could not intervene.[88] Similarly, in Wielechowski, as the Alaska Legislature did not override Governor Walker’s veto, the Court could not order the Legislature’s initial payment structure to be reinstated. In this sense, the Alaska Supreme Court establishes a precedent wherein the appropriations process takes precedent over any decision by the Alaska Legislature to order the dedication and continuity of funds. This, again, follows the logic of the establishment of the Permanent Fund to provide for future generations in Alaska, where one payment structure likely will not remain viable overtime and the State will likely be required to eventually diversify to account for its changing financial needs.
Adopting Universal Basic Income on a National Level
Following a review of the Permanent Fund’s legal history in Alaska, it is clear that numerous structures have adapted across the state to facilitate the development of the income reserve. This structure began in the Alaska Constitution, wherein legislators and voters alike decided to create a Permanent Fund wherein 25% of the state’s mineral revenues were to be set aside in a legislative account for future use. Shortly after the Permanent Fund’s establishment, the universal basic income PFD was established, though quickly shut down by the United States Supreme Court in Zobel v. Williams due to its improper division of income to favor longer-term residents. In response, the modern PFD structure was established, wherein a legislatively adopted formula was created to evenly provision a portion of the income to state residents. In this structure, two accounts are operational—one, the Principal, where income is saved for future use and not spent; and two, the Earnings Reserve, where income is allocated to be distributed in the PFD and for other legislative needs.[89] Most recently, the case of Wielechowski v. State prevented the PFD from being considered as legislatively mandated, instead allowing the dividend to be varied to account for State need and varying levels of income generation. On the whole, this system has allowed continuous annual distributions of around $1,000 or more to residents of Alaska for over fifty years, all while saving now up to $81 billion for future use.
In order for Alaska’s PFD to be feasible in other states, similar economic conditions would likely need to be in place for state governments to feel an incentive to reserve billions of dollars for unspecified future use, effectively capping their budget in the short-term in order to increase it in the long-term. Indeed, according to the most recently available data, Alaska is the U.S. state that generates the largest annual budget surplus, ending fiscal year 2022 having earned 129.2% of their yearly expenses.[90] Though a great majority of U.S. states are also currently operating on a budget surplus (and, thus, theoretically have funds to place towards a sort of Permanent Fund), their margins are relatively lower. That being said, similar resource economy states such as North Dakota could feasibly operate a UBI program similar to Alaska: North Dakota’s current budget surplus is around $1.8 billion,[91] so dividing 25% of the surplus (as is allocated by the PFD in Alaska) by the state’s population of around 796,568 creates a dividend of $564—a smaller payment generated by Alaska’s PFD but significant still as an economic stimulus.
Federally, on the other hand, such a policy would be unlikely to work: the U.S. currently operates on a budget deficit of $1.83 trillion, so generating the funds for an annual dividend would either require the government to take out more debt or increase its rate of taxation only to distribute the funds earned through taxes evenly across its citizens.[92] In spite of this debt, national politics has begun to recognize the public desire for increased, unfettered access to guaranteed federal funds: in February of 2025, current U.S. President Donald Trump proposed a potential Sovereign Wealth Fund to “promote fiscal sustainability, lessen the burden of taxes on American families and small businesses, establish economic security for future generations, and promote United States economic and strategic leadership internationally”—though he has yet to propose a specific monetary amount divided to American citizens or give details on on how such a fund would operate.[93] Across the globe, though, UBI seems to demonstrate some feasibility in specific cases; for example, there are countries that do operate on a budget surplus and could benefit from the enactment of a universal basic income system. For example, the island nation of Tuvalu currently has a budget surplus of $15 million that could be allocated towards an annual UBI of around $1,300 for its citizens.[94] This UBI, for example, would be useful in combating the high cost of accessing healthcare in the region due to its geographic isolation, as well as increase citizens’ budgets to access fresh produce which tends to be costlier.[95]
Turning to the legality of enacting a universal basic income across the U.S., it is clear that Alaska’s PFD structure would ultimately prevail in standardizing the global structure of such disbursements. As the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Zobel v. Williams, universal basic income distributions are subject to the regulations enacted as part of the Equal Protection Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus two things must occur: first, governments enacting UBI must require that the distribution of these funds is truly equal so as to not unequally prejudice certain groups, and second, that any residency requirements established in order for funds to be received must pass some level of “minimum rationality.”[96] In response to these rulings, Alaska set up an equal payment system and set up a residency requirement wherein to receive one years’ PFD, the applicant need only be a resident for the entire calendar year preceding the year of application with certain approved absences granted for education and travel.[97] Further, Alaska specifically designed its current PFD structure to be able to respond to the state’s fluctuating economy through its distribution formula, wherein only a percentage of the state’s income is dedicated towards the PFD. As established in Wielechowski, though, this percentage can be modified by the Alaska Legislature and vetoed by the state governor as merely another routine appropriation if funds could be better used elsewhere in the state’s budget. This structure allows the UBI to be a living fund for a government, able to be modified given individual constraints while still managing to serve the needs of its citizenry proportional to the governmental excess revenues earned. Alaska, however, is currently better legally suited for maintaining a UBI the state has constitutionally adopted an anti-dedication clause, expressly forcing the government to reestablish the UBI every year and banning them from creating a blanket payment system that cannot adapt to changing circumstances. If states or other governments wished to set up a similar structure to the PFD, it would be wise for them to similarly enact an anti-dedication clause to ensure that the enactment of UBI will not cause them financial ruin. As a closing note, it is valuable to analyze the PFD’s unique existence as the sole functioning UBI across the world. While many pilot programs have been initiated, their existence has not been self-sufficient: take, for example, GiveDirectly’s charity initiative in Kenyan villages to determine the effects of blanket cash distributions, which wouldn’t have existed without the expressly limited and definite supply of funds given to participating villages.[98] Alaska, however, has managed to establish both a specific revenue stream to fund its UBI and continue its profitability fifty years after its enactment, all while saving over $80 billion for the State’s future use. Here, though, it is crucial to realize that Alaska’s success in providing UBI to its citizens is as a direct result of the State’s unique financial motivations that do not currently exist elsewhere. Alaska has known since the discovery of oil on its land that, one day, its key economic source would eventually run dry. To prolong the State’s economic independence, the state recognized the need to establish an alternate financial source it could draw from following its fossil fuel dependency. Alaska’s PFD was enacted just eleven years after the state’s acceptance into the Union, at a time when its place within the wider conglomerate was uncertain. Now, however, it has been almost half a century since the U.S. has drastically altered its constituent regions, so instituting a new UBI now would constitute a drastic statewide economic restructuring, which would be complicated to implement. Further, recent nationwide economic trends show significant fluctuations in state budgets, with budget cuts following the Covid-19 pandemic totaling $1.22 trillion across all state governments.[99] On the chance that the state overestimates how much it can feasibly provide to its residents, it risks falling into a state of economic receivership and, thus, an annual and cyclical pattern of debt to its citizens that would be difficult to circumvent without eliminating the policy in its entirety. This quick dissolution would undoubtely create political dilemmas, as can be seen in Alaska. Understandably, those in rural Alaska who depend on the PFD to afford essentials and counteract their high cost of living do not wish to relinquish what they feel is their due.[100] Thus, certain political parties would be compelled to adopt differing policies around UBI—in Alaska, for example, Republicans tend to feel a motivation to expand the PFD and cut other critical governmental services to facilitate this expansion, while Democrats tend to support reducing the overall distribution amounts in order to fund more targeted welfare initiatives.[101] Currently, the failure of Alaska’s Governor Mike Dunleavy to entertain any reduction to the PFD is inhibiting the federal funding of public education, with arts departments and school sports across schools in the state being forced to shutter as a result of this political tension.[102] Thus, it is clear adopting a UBI would clearly implicate a state taking on more political tension, which both political parties and state citizens are sure to find disagreeable.
[1] See Alaska Permanent Fund Amendment, Proposition 2 (1976), Ballotpedia.org, https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Permanent_Fund_Amendment,_Proposition_2_(1976). See also History of The Alaska Permanent Fund, Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, https://apfc.org/who-we-are/history-of-the-alaska-permanent-fund/.
[2] Alaska Permanent Fund Amendment, supra at 1.
[3] See Caleb Mills, Alaska Is a Case Study for Universal Basic Income, Geopolitical Monitor (Jan. 15, 2024), https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/alaska-is-a-case-study-for-universal-basic-income/. See also PFD Study Shows Little Impact On Crime, Providing Important Research On Universal Income, University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social and Economic Research (Feb. 14, 2019), https://iseralaska.org/2019/02/pfd-study-shows-little-impact-on-crime-providing-important-research-on-universal-income/: “The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) is the world’s only continuous universal and unconditional income program, which is also known as a Universal Basic Income (UBI) program.”
[4] See Oil Discovered In Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay, History.com (last updated Jan. 30, 2025),
[5] See Timeline of Industry in Alaska, Alaska Oil & Gas Association, https://www.aoga.org/industry-history/.
[6] See Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 453 (1980). To avoid confusion with other cases between the same parties, including another at the Alaska Supreme Court level of Williams v. Zobel, this case will hereinafter be referred to as “Williams II” (as it was the second case between these parties to be decided by the Alaska Supreme Court).
[7] See Capt. Kristin Carl, Permanent Fund Dividend: Benefits of Alaskan Life, Eielson Air Force Base (Dec. 16, 2013),
[8] See Fran Whitlock, The Alaska Permanent Fund: A model for a Universal Basic Dividend?, Earth4All (Apr. 4, 2024), https://earth4all.life/views/the-alaska-permanent-fund/. See also QuickFacts, Alaska, United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/AK/BZA210221 (Median household income is listed as above $89,000 per year as of 2023).
[9] See Michelle Saport, New ISER Report: What is The PFD’s Effect on Socio-Economic Well-Being?, University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social and Economic Research (Jun. 28, 2019), https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/news/archive/2019/06/iser-research-pfd-effect-socio-economic-well-being.cshtml. It is worth noting here, however, that this report does note that the poverty-reducing effects of the PFD on these groups have diminished over time—not inherently due to the structure of the PFD, but instead through the structure of Alaska Native regional corporations, whose annual dividends to members have increased over time while the PFD has remained relatively constant (and, thus, is now less responsible for economic improvement than in years prior).
[10] The Freedom Dividend, Yang 2020, https://2020.yang2020.com/policies/the-freedom-dividend/.
[11] United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, Universal Basic Income in Asia and the Pacific: A Pragmatic Policy Choice or Unattainable Utopia? (2024), 3, https://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/publications/ubi-in-asia-and-the-pacific.
[12] Abhijit Banerjee, et al., Universal Basic Income: Short-Term Results from a Long-Term Experiment in Kenya (2023), 8, 11, https://poverty-action.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/UBI_main_paper.pdf.
[13] About GiveDirectly, GiveDirectly, https://www.givedirectly.org/about/.
[14] See Williams II, supra note 6, at 450.
[15] Id, at 454.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. See also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Alaska Const. art. 1 § 8.
[18] Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
[19] This right is not specifically enumerated under the U.S. Constitution, though under U.S. Supreme Court case law it is believed to be a consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See supra, note 17. Despite the explicit recognition of the freedom of intranational travel here, the U.S. Supreme Court held in case Shapiro v. Thompson that “the Constitution guarantees the right of interstate movement.” See 394 U.S. 618, 619 (1969).
[20] See Williams II, supra note 6, at 451.
[21] See 415 U.S. 250 (1974), and 419 U.S. 393 (1975), respectively.
[22] See Rational Basis Test, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test.
[23] See Williams II, supra note 6, at 452.
[24] Id, at 453.
[25] See State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
[26] See Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422, 427 (Alaska 1980), hereinafter “Williams I.”
[27] See Williams II, supra note 6, at 453.
[28] See Williams II, supra note 6, at 456 for a similar exploration of this issue.
[29] Id, at 457–8.
[30] See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
[31] Id.
[32] See Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 19, at 618.
[33] Id.
[34] Id, at 632.
[35] See Alaska Stat. § 37.13.145 and 140.
[36] Alaska Stat. 37.13.140.
[37] Alaska Stat. § 43.23.025.
[38] See Sean Maguire, Alaska House Shrinks PFD in Draft Budget After Chaotic Committee Hearing, Anchorage Daily News, Apr. 11, 2025, https://www.adn.com/politics/alaska-legislature/2025/04/11/alaska-house-shrinks-pfd-in-draft-budget-after-chaotic-committee-hearing/.
[39] Summary of Dividend Applications & Payments, State of Alaska Department of Revenue,
[40] See Our Performance, Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, https://apfc.org/performance/.
[41] Id.
[42] See Wielechowski v. Alaska, 403 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2017), at 1143.
[43] Id. See also Alaska Const. art. 9, §§ 7, 15.
[44] See Wielechowski, supra note 42.
[45] Id.
[46] Id, at 1145.
[47] Id.
[48] See Nathaniel Herz, Gov. Walker’s Veto Cuts Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends to $1,022, Anchorage Daily News, Sep. 23, 2016,
[49] Id. See also Alaska State Debt, 2004–2017, Ballotpedia.org, https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_state_debt,_2004-2017.
[50] See Nathaniel Herz, supra note 47.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] See Alaska Const., art. 9, § 7.
[54] See Wielechowski, supra note 42, at 1143.
[55] Id at 1144 (internal citations omitted).
[56] Id.
[57] Id, at 1146. Citing Hickel v. Cowper, 874 P.2d 922, 926–28 (Alaska 1994).
[58] See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
[59] See Alaska Ballot Measure 1, Constitutional Convention Question (2022), Ballotpedia.org,
[60] See Wiechelowski, supra note 42, at 1147. Citing Hickel v. Cowper, supra note 56, at 927.
[61] See Alaska Const., Art. 9, § 7 (supra note 50).
[62] See State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 209 (Alaska 1982).
[63] Id.
[64] Id. Citing 6 Alaska Const.Conv.Proceed., app. V, at 106-07 (emphasis added). The Court notes that this wording was later changed, though, “to allow for the setting up of certain special funds, such as sinking funds for the repayment of bonds, but to prohibit the earmarking of any special tax to that sinking fund.” See State v. Alex, supra note 62, at 210, citing 4 Alaska Const.Conv.Proceed. 2363.
[65] See Wielechowski v. State, supra note 42, at 1147.
[66] Id, citing Sonneman v. Hickel, 836 P.2d 936, 938–9 (Alaska 1992).
[67] Adam Crum, Spring 2025 Revenue Forecast, Alaska Department of Revenue, Tax Division (revised Mar. 12, 2025), https://tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/RSB.aspx?Year=2025&Type=Spring#program1820. See Chapter 2, table 2: $1,316 million generated from revenue taxes, $1,153.9 from royalties.
[68] Policy Brief: A History of Alaska Oil Taxes and How They Work, Alaska Policy Forum (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://alaskapolicyforum.org/2020/10/history-alaska-oil-taxes/. See also id.
[69] See BLM Alaska Oil and Gas, U.S. Department of the Interior, Oil and Land Management,
[70] See BLM Contemplates Oil and Gas Royalty Reform, Van Ness Feldmann, LLP (Apr. 23, 2015),
[71] See Wielechowski, supra note 42, at 1149.
[72] See Alaska Permanent Fund Amendment, Proposition 2, supra note 1. See also id at 1151.
[73] See Wielechowski, supra note 42, at 1150–1.
[74] Id, at 1151, footnote 62 (citing 2 Plans, 1 Fund, Anchorage Daily News, Apr. 21, 1976).
[75] Id at 1147.
[76] See Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: An Experiment in Wealth Distribution, for Basic Income European Network’s 9th International Congress (Sep. 2002), 12–13,
ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/gold.pdf.
[77] See Scott Cohn, With Oil Production In Freefall, Alaska, America’s Worst State For Business, Chases A New Carbon Boom, Consumer News & Business Channel (Jul. 11, 2023),
[78] See Wielechowski, supra note 42, at 1148.
[79] Id, at 1151.
[80] Id, at 1152.
[81] Id.
[82] Id, at 1153.
[83] See Simpson v. Murkowski, 129 P.3d 435, 446 (Alaska 2006).
[84] Id.
[85] Id, citing Alaska Const., art. 2, § 15.
[86] See Simpson v. Murkowski, supra note 83, citing Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P.2d 793, 795 (Alaska 1977) (internal citation omitted).
[87] Alaska Const., art. 2, § 16.
[88] See Simpson, supra note 83, at 446–7.
[89] See Understanding Our Fund, Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, https://apfc.org/fund-structure.
[90] See Joanna Biernacka-Lievestro and Page Forrest, Number of States With Annual Deficits Hit Record Low in Fiscal Year 2022, Pew Research Center (Sep. 3, 2024), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2024/09/03/number-of-states-with-annual-deficits-hit-record-low-in-fiscal-year-2022.
[91] See North Dakota, Urban Institute (Apr. 2025), https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/projects/state-fiscal-briefs/north-dakota. In fiscal year 2021, North Dakota earned $12.2 billion, and spent $10.6 billion.
[92] Some forms these taxes could take are negative income taxes (NITs), value-added taxes (VATs) on produced goods, or other progressive taxes that would overall contribute to the redistribution of income down the economic ladder. To generate around $1000 per person in an annual dividend comparable to Alaska’s PFD, though, the government would be required to tax citizens on average an additional $1000, though, which could require drastic tax hikes in higher income brackets which likely would not be seen as politically viable.
[93] See A Plan For Establishing A United States Sovereign Wealth Fund, The White House (Feb. 3, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/a-plan-for-establishing-a-united-states-sovereign-wealth-fund/.
[94] See GDP (Current US$) – Tuvalu, World Bank Group, data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=TV. See also Tuvalu, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/tuvalu.
[95] See Jordan Emont and Gowri Anandarajah, Rising Waters and a Smaller Island: What Should Physicians Do for Tuvaluans?, American Medical Association Journal of Ethics (Dec. 2017),
journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/rising-waters-and-smaller-island-what-should-physicians-do-tuvaluans/2017-12. See also Po-Jen Lin et al., Exploring The Link Between Home Garden Use And Severe Obesity: Insights From A Nationwide Survey In Tuvalu, Journal of Global Health (Sep. 1, 2023),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10472202.
[96] See Zobel v. Williams, supra note 30, at 60.
[97] See Eligibility Requirements, State of Alaska, Department of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend (updated 2025), https://pfd.alaska.gov/eligibility/eligibility-requirements. Another, more vague residency requirement is that residents must intend to remain in Alaska for the foreseeable future—a requirement that is only governed by the promise of applicants and which largely does not appear enforceable.
[98] See Banerjee, et al., supra note 12, and GiveDirectly, supra note 13.
[99] See Liz Farmer, State Budgets Are Downsizing, Pew Research Center (Jul. 15, 2024), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2024/07/15/state-budgets-are-downsizing.
[100] See Sean Maguire, supra note 38: “Supporters of a statutory dividend, such as Big Lake Republican Rep. Kevin McCabe, said their constituents were counting on a PFD for fuel oil, snow tires and their children’s educations. But they offered no way to pay for it… Rep. Nellie Jimmie, a Toksook Bay Democrat, gave an emotional address to the House before supporting the reduced dividend[: …] ‘The dividend isn’t extra money for vacations. It is not to buy a truck… It is for heating fuel. It is for your water bills. It’s an airfare to go to a funeral. It’s money for elders who have nothing to fall back on.’”
[101] Id: “The Republican [Alaska State Legislature] minority broadly expressed frustration about the process used by the Democrat-dominated majority to advance the budget [reducing the proposed size of the 2025 PFD] and to hear amendments on Friday.”
[102] See Sean Maguire, Alaska Legislature Narrowly Approves $1,000 Bsa Boost After Dunleavy Vows Veto, Anchorage Daily News (Apr. 11, 2025), https://www.adn.com/politics/alaska-legislature/2025/04/11/alaska-senate-narrowly-approves-1000-bsa-boost-after-dunleavy-vows-veto/. See also Iris Samuels, Anchorage School District Proposes Cutting Teacher Positions, Middle School Sports And More Amid Flat State Funding, Anchorage Daily News (Jan. 31, 2025), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/education/2025/01/31/anchorage-school-district-proposes-cutting-teacher-positions-middle-school-sports-and-more-amid-flat-state-funding/; and Jenna Kunze, Anchorage School District Notifies Hundreds Of Educators And Staff Of Potential ‘displacement,’ Anchorage Daily News (Mar. 31, 2025), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/education/2025/03/31/anchorage-school-district-notifies-hundreds-of-educators-and-staff-of-potential-displacement/.