Introduction

According to international law, states may supply terrorists with arms but not artwork, grenades but not gold, and dynamite but not diamonds. This interpretation in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s most recent ruling draws a distinction between the contribution of monetary support and the provision of materials to be used in committing terrorist acts. However, this new line between money and means may further blur the one between terror and war—and the immense human suffering of over eleven years, recognized by the Court in this case, has already demonstrated the consequences.

Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (Ukraine v. Russian Federation^[1]) is the most recent contentious case decided by the International Court of Justice as well as the first and currently only case involving the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) to come before the Court.^[2] Proceedings began in 2017 and the case was concluded in January 2024.^[3] The claims under the ICSFT and CERD are legally, though not historically, separate. With respect to the ICSFT, the case concerns Russia’s support of separatists who committed terrorist acts in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine alleged that Russia’s sponsorship of its proxies in Ukraine supported their commission of terrorist acts, including the shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines (civilian) Flight MH17, the attempted assassination of a Ukrainian member of Parliament, and the bombing of civilians in cities including Volnovakha, Mariupol, Kramatorsk, Avdiivka, and Kharkiv.^[4]

A defining question in evaluating Ukraine’s ICSFT claims was whether the provision of weapons and training to armed groups constituted “funds” and, therefore, financing of terrorism, or if the ICSFT only applies to monetary support. Ukraine argued that “according to its ordinary meaning and read in context and in light of the object and purpose of the ICSFT…the term ‘funds’ is not limited to ‘financial assets’ but covers all forms of property, including weapons and other non-financial assets.”^[5] Ukraine also cited the French and Spanish texts of the ICSFT, in which the phrase “assets of every kind” (“biens de toute nature” and “los bienes de cualquier tipo” respectively) supports the inclusion of weapons and training in “assets.”^[6] Russia contended that “the term ‘funds’ used in Article 2 of the ICSFT is limited to resources intended to finance the commission of acts of terrorism, rather than resources that are themselves used as means of committing those same terrorist acts…[the term] must be read in the context of the provision as a whole, in particular in light of the specific categories of assets listed, namely ‘bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit, as well as documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such assets,’ all of which ‘assets’ have an inherently monetary value as such.”^[7] Russia cited the Arabic and Russian texts of the ICSFT and maintained that the term “assets” (respectively, “أموال”, “amwaal,” and “активы,” “aktivy”) conveys a limited meaning of assets of a financial or monetary nature.^[8] Article 28 of the ICSFT states that “the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts [of this treaty] are equally authentic.”^[9]

The judgment aligns with Russia’s interpretation, stating that “Context indicates that term ‘funds’ is confined to resources possessing financial and monetary character and does not extend to means used to commit acts of terrorism…[it is] The Court’s conclusion that term “funds” refers to resources provided or collected for their monetary value and does not include means used to commit acts of terrorism, including weapons or training camps.”^[10] Thus, the emphasis is on the provision of assets with monetary value while excluding the means to commit terrorist acts.

I will begin the paper by introducing the ICSFT and summarizing the Court’s reading of the term. I argue that the Court’s construction of funds contradicts its methodology, specifically its obligation to interpret the ICSFT in good faith in accordance with its “object and purpose,” and with respect to special definitions given to terms by states parties. To do this, I use a critical and historical inquiry approach, explaining and analyzing the context in which the ICSFT places itself by examining the documents to which it refers, the international legal framework pertaining to terrorism, the drafting history of the treaty, and the separate opinions. I contend that the ICJ’s narrow interpretation of funds leads to an overly narrow interpretation of the ICSFT that contravenes its object and purpose and limits its ability to prevent and respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Finally, I draw from the historical context to propose that the judgment sets a concerning precedent for future cases concerning international terrorism.

From Convention to Court: Evaluation of Funds in the Judgment

            The ICSFT was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1999 and entered into force in 2002,^[11] noting in its preamble the calls from the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and multiple General Assembly resolutions to ensure a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of international terrorism and to prevent and counteract all “direct or indirect” financing of terrorism.^[12] Article 1 of the ICSFT defines the term “funds” as follows:

“Funds” means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, traveller’s cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.^[13]

Article 2 covers the conditions under which an act may be determined as an offense under the ICSFT:

1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:

a. An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or

b. Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

The article also states that for an act to constitute an offense, it is not necessary for the funds to be used to carry out an offense as outlined above. As a result, the question is not whether an act of terrorism occurred or even whether funds were provided, but whether the (potential) supplier provided or collected funds with the intention or knowledge that they would be used to carry out such an act.

The Court’s methodology for applying the ICSFT relies on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,^[14] an international agreement that has been called the “treaty on treaties.”^[15]  In defining the most important rules concerning treaties between states, such as what treaties are, how they are created and how they are brought into force, the Vienna Convention stipulates that treaties must be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose,” but a “special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”^[16] In this case, the parties intended to give funds a special meaning because they provided a specific definition of it in Article 1 of the ICSFT. As Judge Bhandari highlights, the interpretation of funds was determinative of multiple parts of Ukraine’s claims under the ICSFT, but per the Vienna Convention, “the focus of interpretation must therefore be on the parties’ intended special meaning, which is the text following the verb ‘means’ in Article 1.”^[17] In the judgment, the Court notes that the list including “bank credits, traveller’s cheques, [etc]” refers to the “legal documents or instruments” and not “assets” but adds that “while the phrase ‘assets of every kind’ is an expansive one, the documents or instruments listed in the definition are ordinarily used for the purpose of evidencing title or interest only with regard to certain types of assets, such as currency, bank accounts, shares, or bonds.”^[18]

The Court further attempts to establish this qualification by citing Articles 8, 12, 13, and 18 of the ICSFT as the context in which “funds” is used, the treaty’s object and purpose, and the travaux préparatoires. First, it argues that by addressing measures for the identification, detection, freezing, or seizure of funds used for terrorism financing, Article 8 suggests that the term “funds” covers different forms of monetary support.^[19] Likewise, in the Court’s view, Article 12’s mention of bank secrecy and Article 13’s provision that none of the offenses named in Article 2 may be regarded as a “fiscal offense” again imply that the ICSFT is concerned with monetary transactions.^[20] Article 18, which concerns the institution of practical measures regulating financial transactions, also suggests that the ICSFT is concerned with monetary support for terrorism.^[21] With regard to the treaty’s object and purpose, the Court holds that the use of the word “financing” in the ICSFT’s name and preamble demonstrates an intention not to prevent support for terrorism in general, but a specific form of support, namely that of a financial character.^[22] Finally, the Court refers to the drafting history and travaux préparatoires of the ICSFT, claiming that:

the travaux préparatoires confirm the above interpretation of the term “funds”…The record of the negotiations appears to indicate that the concern of the drafters was that international law did not provide means for tracing and effectively punishing those who contribute finances to terrorist organizations, arguing that terrorist acts could be prevented by depriving criminal groups of their financial resources. It was this gap that the ICSFT was intended to fill.^[23]

The Court also notes that the concern of the drafters was not the means that might be used to commit terrorist acts, but the acquisition of financial resources that would enable them to acquire those means, and that the original proposal by France as well as subsequent proposals regarding Article 1 focused on the issue of financial support.^[24] Thus, “in the view of the Court, the context provided by these provisions suggests that the term “funds” as used in Article 1, paragraph 1, of the ICSFT, is confined to resources that possess a financial or monetary character and does not extend to the means used to commit acts of terrorism.”^[25]

Interpreting “Funds” in Context

In the legal context of the ICSFT, the text and documents on which the Court bases its conclusion do not confirm its interpretation of funds by any means and, at best, could indicate a lack of clarity on the issue. Drawing from the original draft of the ICSFT proposed by France, documents pertinent to the ICSFT’s history and role in international law, and the separate opinions, I argue that the Court’s interpretation is highly problematic for the following reasons. First, the Court’s survey of other documents relevant to the ICSFT, including the documents mentioned in the preamble, the travaux préparatoires, records of the drafting history, and the international legal framework pertaining to the prevention of terrorism, is limited and raises questions as to whether it is sufficient to make such an impactful claim regarding the definition of funds. On another note, focus and scope are not equivalent, so even granting that the Court proves the ICSFT’s focus on financial support for terrorism, this cannot be taken as necessarily meaning that the provision of means to commit terrorist acts is excluded. Furthermore, the Court’s definition of funds also contradicts the ICSFT’s construction of intent by apparently requiring the alleged financier’s intent to have been for the suspected terrorist(s) to utilize provided assets for purely financial purposes and not actually to carry out terrorist acts using those assets. Additional logical issues arise with the Court’s qualification of the definition because assets do not necessarily lose their economic value when used as the means to commit terrorist acts. The Court potentially creates an issue of circularity if the word “financing” is understood to mean the act of raising funds (as it was in the original proposal), with “funds” having been given a special meaning per the Vienna Convention.

Rather than taking the first draft of the ICSFT as a decisive reflection of the drafters’ intent, in light of this text’s purpose as a starting point for discussion and refinement, it is more productive to compare the differences between the original proposal and the final version. Most significant for understanding the term “funds” is Article 1 of both texts, which defines the key term of the treaty. Article 1 of the original draft proposed by France stated that:

“Financing” means any contribution aimed at providing by direct or indirect methods funds to third parties, including through organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, cultural or social goals; such contributions may be public or private, and result from lawful or unlawful activities such as:

• Donations and fund raising,
• Commercial activities;
• Organized traffic in goods and persons,
• Robbery, racketeering, abduction and hostage-taking,
• Swindles, fraud, embezzlement of assistance or subsidies.^[26]

The most notable difference is the key term defined in this article. In contrast to the final draft, “financing” is the key term in the original proposal rather than “funds.” It is possible to take the first draft as the purest statement of the drafters’ intent and to read it as one centered on monetary support for terrorism, as the Court does. However, while original drafts and similar texts may provide clues to intent in many cases, here it is arguably the transition that occurred in the process of revision from the absence of any definition of funds to such an expansive one (“assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form”) that signifies the importance to the drafters of including non-monetary support for terrorism. It is apparent that the drafters not only recognized the lack of clarity surrounding what may count as funds to be raised and provided but ultimately decided that this needed to be the key definition and focus of the treaty. Additionally, replacing the list of activities that may raise funds in the first draft with the brief phrase “however acquired” in the final treaty emphasizes the most extensive definition of funds. The Court’s statement that the drafting history of the ICSFT supports the limiting interpretation therefore appears to contradict the drafters’ move away from “a focus on the issue of financial or monetary support” and, it would then seem, the intent of the treaty.

Furthermore, the preamble of the ICSFT mentions a number of prior UN documents and resolutions to which the authors of this convention intended it to respond; a survey of these documents, at minimum, demonstrates that the Court’s interpretation of the language and background of the ICSFT has been significantly reductive. After citing the UN Charter and its principles of friendly international relations, the first statement of the ICSFT is very general: “Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”^[27] The following document mentioned is the General Assembly’s Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, which states similarly that “[States must] act together to defeat the threats to States and people posed by terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” and does not allude at all to particularly financial support for terrorism.^[28]

Next, the preamble “recall[s] also all the relevant General Assembly resolutions on the matter”^[29] and mentions explicitly resolution 49/60, which encouraged states to “review urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the matter” (emphasis added).^[30] This resolution also affirmed broadly that states “must refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts.”^[31] Finally, it urged states to “refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens” (emphasis added).^[32] The use of six different verbs with regard to “terrorist activities” and the nature of each of those words indicate its comprehensive intention, and its specification of terrorist training camps is not only precise but prescient to the present case. In sum, it seems counterintuitive that a “comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of [the prevention, repression, and elimination of terrorism]” would limit itself to financial support for terrorism, and terms such as “assist” are sufficiently wide-ranging as to encompass monetary and non-monetary support for terrorism. The ICSFT’s placement of itself in dialogue with this resolution calls into question the Court’s narrow interpretation of funds.

The second General Assembly resolution referenced by the ICSFT is 51/210, which established the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for elaborating the ICSFT. To date, the Ad Hoc Committee established by resolution 51/210 has completed two other counterterrorism treaties that have been ratified by the General Assembly, namely the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and is working on a comprehensive legal framework regarding the issue.^[33] The latter has not been completed, but the drafts reveal that this proposed treaty is concerned with the prosecution of terrorists rather than those who support them.^[34] The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism names nineteen universal legal instruments to prevent terrorist acts, including the ICSTB and ICSANT; none of these, besides the ICSFT, address support for terrorism.^[35] The ICSFT stands as the lone framework in international law, whether fully extant or in draft stages, that pertains to the prosecution of support for terrorism—financial or otherwise. This is recognized in the ICSFT itself: “Existing multilateral legal instruments do not expressly address such financing.”^[36] Therefore, in the context of international terrorism law, it seems questionable to argue that the ICSFT is only intended to cover monetary support for terrorism.

The preamble of the ICSFT includes a specific call to implement paragraph 3 of resolution 51/210.^[37] Sections 3a and 3e respectively discuss consultations and legal assistance; these are less critical to evaluating whether the ICSFT’s intent concerns solely financial support for terrorism. Section 3b calls for states to research “methods of detection of explosives and other harmful substances that can cause death or injury, undertake consultations on the development of standards for marking explosives to identify their origin in post-blast investigations, and promote cooperation and transfer of technology, equipment and related materials, where appropriate.”^[38] Section 3c acknowledges “the risk of terrorists using electronic or wire communications systems and networks to carry out criminal acts,” and section 3d warns of “the abuse of organizations, groups or associations, including those with charitable, social or cultural goals” as a cover for terrorist activities.^[39] Section 3f requests that states act to prevent the financing of terrorism, and adopt “regulatory measures to prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements.”^[40] This section can perhaps be read as the one most directly concerned with financial support for terrorism, and in a reading that best supports the Court’s conclusions, it may be significant that this section is mentioned twice in the ICSFT’s preamble. However, a stronger focus on financial support does not mean that the provision of non-financial support, including supplying weapons and training, is excluded from the ICSFT. Taken as a whole, this paragraph of the resolution addresses weapons and other “means” that may facilitate or be used to commit terrorist acts, rather than resources of a purely monetary character.

Furthermore, because a treaty’s focus is not necessarily the same as its scope, the evidence from which the Court draws also seems too limited to establish the scope of the ICSFT. For example, the Court argues that the fact that some of the ICSFT’s provisions do not apply  to non-financial assets supports the claim that the ICSFT is concerned primarily with monetary support for terrorism.^[41] However, some of the ICSFT’s provisions are likewise inapplicable to the non-monetary assets that are included in the Court’s interpretation. Judge Charlesworth gives the example of Article 18, paragraph 2(b) which states that states parties shall consider “feasible measures to detect or monitor the physical cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the freedom of capital movements,” a provision that is inapplicable to energy resources such as oil provided for their monetary value.^[42] Thus, the fact that some sections of the ICSFT apply only to specific types of funds does not indicate that the special meaning of funds should be limited in contrast to what its definition states. The word “assets” is already an expansive one, ordinarily signifying property with some economic value; the addition of the phrase “of every kind” further underscores the authors’ intent for funds to encompass the provision of all kinds of support for terrorism.

Finally, the Court’s interpretation complicates the applicability of the element of intent and creates an issue of circularity. First, nothing about the wording of Article 2, the provision that establishes the question of intent, suggests that states are only responsible for suppressing financial support for terrorism. In fact, it logically supports Article 1’s definition of funds as “assets of every kind.” For instance, Article 2 states that an individual commits an offense if they provide or collect funds “with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out [terrorist acts]” (emphasis added). It is difficult to explain how assets that are used as the means to commit terrorist acts, such as weapons, are excluded from the phrasing of Article 2. Rather, it seems that weapons would be the quintessential example of assets (that is, funds) used to “carry out” acts of terrorism. Moreover, as Judge Charlesworth notes, assets such as weapons do not lose their economic value when they are used as means and not for financial purposes; if an asset “improve[s] the financial situation, or the equity, of the terrorist group[,] whether it has done so directly or indirectly is not legally relevant.”^[43] Judge Bhandari concurs and likewise highlights that “an asset is a resource or possession with economic value…the Judgment offers no satisfactory explanation for its highly selective conclusion that weapons, of all economically valuable goods, are not assets for the purpose of Article 1.”^[44] Finally, an issue of circularity emerges with the Court’s claim that the ICSFT “specifically concerns the financing aspect of terrorism.”^[45] As Judge Pocar observes, it makes little sense for the Court to argue that “the object of the ICSFT is not to suppress and prevent support for terrorism in general, but rather to prevent and suppress a specific form of support, namely its financing” when “the meaning of ‘financing’ is ‘to raise or collect funds’” and funds have already been defined as “assets of every kind.”^[46] Even if one were to accept the judgment’s justification for its reductive reading of funds, the Court has not provided for these new interpretative issues that emerge, further limiting the ICSFT’s power as a legal instrument to prosecute financing of terrorism.

The resolution of these issues could be achieved through a future judgment that is more faithful to the Court’s methodology (i.e., the Vienna Convention), although this would rely on the emergence of an opportunity to overturn the precedent set in this case. A revision of the ICSFT to explicitly name weapons and other “means” as funds could better guarantee the resolution of this issue. Additionally, the different versions of the ICSFT must be revised to reflect the same meaning across all of the UN languages; Russia and Ukraine’s respective citations of the differing connotations in various versions of the ICSFT demonstrates a real and concerning issue for interpretation of the treaty. Ultimately, the interpretation of funds in this judgment represents a concerning precedent for the interpretation of this critical piece of the international legal framework and international counterterrorism efforts as a whole.

Terrorism versus Territorial Integrity: The Russo-Ukrainian War

These emerging limitations are particularly apparent when examining the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as a case study of how foreign-sponsored terrorism can undermine state sovereignty and escalate to war. Russian ambitions to influence Ukraine began to appear in tangible government actions by 2014, following Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens took to the streets of Kyiv in the winter of 2013-2014 to demand reforms, ties to the EU, and an end to corruption; on February 21, 2014, President Yanukovych fled Kyiv.^[47] Euromaidan, as it is also known, surprised outside observers as an unusual case of sustained mass mobilization caused by foreign policy issues.^[48] The administration’s decisions were a “failed attempt to counterbalance growing Russian influence and ambition” by looking to Western Europe.^[49] But by early February, before Yanukovych’s ouster, a plan had already been under consideration by the Russian government to take advantage of the domestic Ukrainian crisis to annex the Crimean peninsula, and destabilize and eventually annex regions of eastern and southern Ukraine.^[50]

Yanukovych’s defeat came as the ultimate success for Euromaidan, but it also presented a major political opportunity for Russia, given the instability of the new government.^[51] Five days after the revolution, when the new administration was still struggling to consolidate its power and take control of police and security forces loyal to Yanukovych to the end, armed men in unmarked uniforms took control of the Crimean parliament.^[52] Russian intelligence services promptly installed the leader of a pro-Russian party as the new prime minister of Crimea, a geopolitically crucial peninsula with access to the Black Sea.^[53] Ukraine did not successfully resist this move, as the army had been underfunded for decades and had no experience in warfare, while Russian troops were well-trained and equipped and had fought recent wars in Chechnya and Georgia.^[54] The Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was especially significant as the first case of forcible takeover of territory in Europe since the end of World War II.^[55]

On the other hand, pro-Russian sentiment was relatively high in the industrial Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, comprised of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.^[56] The main regional center, Donetsk, was the only major Ukrainian city where ethnic Russians constituted a plurality (almost half of the population), and many Donbas citizens remained attached to Soviet ideology and symbols.^[57] Thus, in the spring of 2014, Russian intelligence agencies initiated destabilization of Ukraine from Donbas.^[58] Russian-backed paramilitary units often trained and financed by the Kremlin and close to Russian oligarchs^[59] proclaimed two new breakaway states, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR).^[60] Ukrainian forces launched a counteroffensive, which prompted Russia to increase its support for the separatists.^[61] By June, the Ukrainian government claimed a continuing influx of trained militants and heavy military equipment including tanks and rocket launchers from Russia, which NATO intelligence confirmed.^[62] The next month, Russian-backed terrorists shot down a civilian airliner, killing all 298 people on board, and Russian artillery and missiles began bombarding Ukrainian territory.^[63] In August, thousands of Russian army units crossed the border to reinforce Russian mercenaries and local militias, stopping the Ukrainian advance and saving the DNR and LNR from imminent defeat.^[64]  Without Russian support and supplies, any actual local political grievances would not have been sufficient for the rebellion’s success, let alone the instigation of a full military conflict,.^[65] Thus, what began as isolated incidents of foreign-sponsored terrorism became bases for Russia to occupy and destabilize key regions of Ukraine and undermine its territorial integrity.

In 2015, Russia continued to provide military support, including supplies, weapons, and personnel, for its puppet regimes in Donetsk and Luhansk, in violation of its agreements with Ukraine.^[66] Russia maintained an ambiguous official position, but by 2018, the Russian government had ceased to pretend that it was not the republics’ sponsor.^[67] According to leaked Russian documents, Russia funds and operates the DNR and LNR in military, administrative, and economic terms.^[68] Russia also maintains a rhetoric of protecting Russian speakers abroad as a pretext for the invasion and annexation of territories (and proclamation of breakaway republics) belonging not only to Ukraine, but also to other sovereign states.^[69] In the present case, neither the DPR nor the LPR received international recognition from any UN member state until 2022, when Russia recognized them as sovereign states and launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine partially under the pretext of protecting the republics. The entirety of both republics is currently viewed by all UN member states except Russia and North Korea as territory of Ukraine, but the area remains under Russian control to this day.

All developments in the conflict after Ukraine submitted its application in 2017 were excluded from the scope of the Court’s judgment. However, viewing the events from 2014 to the present as one sequence demonstrates that the significance of counterterrorism efforts surpasses the critical function of preventing violent and criminal acts. The full-scale invasion violates international law and represents one of the four core international crimes, the crime of aggression.^[70] Still, it could not have occurred without the initial financing of terrorism by one state to subvert another state’s sovereignty. As in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, a weak counterterrorism framework can fail to inhibit states from compromising the independence of other nations and using terrorism as an intermediate step toward escalation. Consequently, a robust international legal framework for the suppression of terrorism financing is crucial not only to protect human rights but state sovereignty. For this reason, the judgment in the present case creates an alarming precedent that will likely limit the power of the ICSFT as a tool for prosecuting support for terrorism. In the interest of maintaining peaceful international relations, it is imperative to restore the meaning of funds that the ICSFT’s special definition provides, which necessarily includes non-financial support for terrorism.

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^[1] Hereafter Russia

^[2] International Court of Justice, “Contentious Cases,” Icj-cij.org, January 17, 2017, https://www.icj-cij.org/contentious-cases.

^[3] International Court of Justice, “Contentious Cases”

^[4] International Court of Justice, “Judgment” January 31, 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/166/166-20240131-jud-01-00-en.pdf.

^[5] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[6] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[7] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[8] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[9] “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,” Un.org, 2024, https://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm.

^[10] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[11] “UNTC,” Un.org, 2024, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18&clang=_en.

^[12] “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”

^[13] “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”

^[14] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[15] “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).” Oxford Public International Law, 2023, opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1498. Accessed 18 Feb. 2025.

^[16] United Nations, “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” October 1969, https://doi.org/10.2307/2199522.

^[17] Dalveer Bhandari, “SEPARATE OPINION of JUDGE BHANDARI,” January 31, 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/166/166-20240131-jud-01-07-en.pdf.

^[18] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[19] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[20] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[21] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[22] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[23] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[24] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[25] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[26] United Nations General Assembly, “Sixth Committee – Fifty-Third Session – Agenda Item 155: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,” November 4, 1998.

^[27] “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”

^[28] United Nations, “Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations,” October 24, 1995, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/200425?ln=en&v=pdf.

^[29] “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”

^[30] United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution 49/60,” February 17, 1995.

^[31] United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution 49/60,” February 17, 1995.

^[32] United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution 49/60,” February 17, 1995.

^[33] United Nations, “Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 (Terrorism) — Ad Hoc and Special Committees (Established on the Recommendation of the Sixth Committee),” Un.org, 2023, https://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/.

^[34] United Nations, “Ad Hoc Committee”

^[35] https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/international-legal-instruments

^[36] “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”

^[37] “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”

^[38] United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution 51/210,” December 17, 1996.

^[39] United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution 51/210,” December 17, 1996.

^[40] United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution 51/210,” December 17, 1996.

^[41] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[42] Hilary Charlesworth, “SEPARATE OPINION of JUDGE CHARLESWORTH,” January 31, 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/166/166-20240131-jud-01-09-en.pdf.

^[43] Charlesworth, “SEPARATE OPINION of JUDGE CHARLESWORTH”

^[44] Bhandari, “SEPARATE OPINION of JUDGE BHANDARI”

^[45] International Court of Justice, “Judgment.”

^[46] Fausto Pocar, “SEPARATE OPINION of JUDGE AD HOC POCAR,” January 31, 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/166/166-20240131-jud-01-11-en.pdf.

^[47] Serhii Plokhy, Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine. (S.L.: Basic Books, 2015).

^[48] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[49] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[50] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[51] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[52] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[53] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[54] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[55] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire: The Ukraine Crisis in the Historical Perspective,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/26499843.

^[56] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[57] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[58] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[59] Plokhy, Gates of Europe.

^[60] Thomas De Waal, “Eastern Ukraine: Different Dynamics,” Uncertain Ground: Engaging With Europe’s De Facto States and Breakaway Territories. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26907.10.

^[61] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire.”

^[62] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire.”

^[63] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire.”

^[64] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire.”

^[65] De Waal, “Eastern Ukraine: Different Dynamics.”

^[66] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire.”

^[67] De Waal, “Eastern Ukraine: Different Dynamics.”

^[68] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire.”

^[69] Plokhy, “The Return of the Empire.”

^[70] International Criminal Court, “How the Court Works,” International Criminal Court, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works.