The election of Joe Biden in 2020, bringing an end to Donald Trump’s presidency, sparked a wave of false allegations from the Republican Party and its conservative allies. Chief among their grievances were claims questioning the legitimacy of votes, with party leaders and right-leaning voters asserting that the election had been rigged. While these allegations lacked substantial evidence, concerns over voter fraud and election integrity remain significant in a nation that boasts representative democracy. Likewise, these tensions raise necessary questions about the mechanics of voting and, more critically, the balance of voters’ rights versus electoral law. 

Adding to this controversy is an electoral conflict in Pennsylvania, which has significant implications for voter rights. Argued before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, Pa. State Conference of the NAACP v. Schmidt saw a coalition of Pennsylvania voters and nonpartisan voting organizations—including the NAACP and the League of Women Voters—sue the state’s acting Secretary of the Commonwealth and county boards. Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 52 U.S.C. § 10101, the plaintiffs argued that rejecting ballots due to errors in the date on mail-in ballots was unlawful. Specifically, they claimed there was a violation of the Materiality Provision (52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B)), which prohibits the denial of votes based on errors to voting-related papers. It specifically asserts that no person shall “deny the right of any individual to vote in any election because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election,” a condition met by each plaintiff in this case. Ultimately, the plaintiffs contended that, under Pennsylvania voter qualifications, the date on a return envelope is “immaterial to determining the timeliness of the voter’s ballot.” The District Court ruled in their favor, declaring the Materiality Provision rendered the date requirement illegitimate due to absence of a genuine dispute.  

However, the U.S Third Circuit Appeals Court later overturned this ruling, reasoning that the Materiality Provision applies only to instances where the state is determining who may vote, not how they vote. In response, several writs of certiorari were filed, hoping to have the Supreme Court address the provision’s scope and, consequently, whether the ballots were improperly disqualified. However, in January of 2025, SCOTUS denied cert to the case.

Given the gravity of NAACP—especially in light of the insurrection, which stemmed from disputes over the electoral process—the Supreme Court denying cert is a grave error. By refusing to confront whether the Materiality Provision protects Pennsylvania voters, the Court is neglecting a crucial issue for the future of voting rights. Prior rulings involving the Materiality Provision offer a basis for comparison, as they affirm a differentiation between biographical and non-biographical voting information. In Martin v. Crittenden (2018), the Georgia U.S. District Court ruled that errors in birth year on ballots, one of the essential details for verifying voter identity, were immaterial as long as the voter could be verified through other means, allowing the ballots to be counted. By contrast, in Ritter v. Migliori (2022), candidates in Lehigh County fought over the inclusion of 257 ballots missing a date on their return envelopes. After originally being dismissed for lack of procedural grounds, the Third Circuit Court ruled, based on the Materiality Provision, that such errors were inconsequential and ordered the votes be counted. However, the Supreme Court later vacated the decision in 2022 on procedural grounds. These conflicting rulings stress a key distinction: if biographical information, which is central to verifying a voter’s identity, can be deemed immaterial, then logically, less consequential errors involving non-biographical information should also be protected. For this reason, the Court should have upheld this principle in Ritter, and, given their close parallels, reaffirmed it in NAACP. Yet, by repeatedly refusing to weigh in, the Supreme Court is undermining the purpose of the Materiality Provision: protecting voters from disenfranchisement due to trivial errors.

Additionally, Pennsylvania election law further emphasizes a hierarchy between these different forms of voter information, especially with regard to mail-in ballots. For instance, the date on the return envelope is required but not as critical as other aspects, such as the ink color used to mark ballots (Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1306-D(a) (2020)). Even the voter declaration does not stress that the date on the ballot must be accurate, only that a date must be present. This has been a tricky subject in the state, with counties having both accepted and rejected ballots that omitted the last two digits of the year on their ballots in the past. Nonetheless, Pennsylvania voter law mandates an extensive process of verifying mail-in ballot eligibility that harps on ensuring biographical information is correct and that only those eligible are voting by mail (Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1302.1-D (2020)). Thus, if mail-in voters were already extensively verified and all other procedures are completed correctly, and if the ballot is received before the 8 PM cut-off time, then the date errors do not outweigh all other correct procedures. Furthermore, voters affirm that their ballot is their sole vote by signing the voter declaration, making it highly unlikely that a minor date discrepancy would equate to a fraudulent vote. Lastly, the affected voters in NAACP consisted largely of older voters, a group protected under the Help America Vote Act, or HAVA, of 2002, which mandates that older voters facing discrepancies in their votes be guaranteed provisional ballots. Hence, their ballots should never have been discounted, as they should have been afforded the safeguard of a provisional vote while the others were being verified. 

A counterpoint, raised by the Third Circuit Court in NAACP, is that the voters’ situation did not implicate the Materiality Provision. The majority opinion focused on the law’s use of the phrase “in determining,” which they argued limited the provision’s application to the pre-voting process, or the process of determining who may vote. However, as Justice Schwartz points out in her dissent, focusing on that phrase ignores other critical parts of the statute. She asserts that the inclusion of the word “any” and the phrase “or other act requisite to voting” was a purposeful vague choice. Moreover, she argues that Congress would have adapted their language if they intended for the Materiality Provision to be limited in scope and confined solely to the voter registration process, emphasizing their intent to make the statute far-reaching. Furthermore, the judges’ opposing views on the statute’s scope add to the necessity of the Supreme Court to clarify its reach, rather than continuing to avoid the issue. 

By denying cert to NAACP v. Schmidt, the Supreme Court continues its pattern of avoiding a definitive stance on the scope of 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B), a failure it previously demonstrated in Ritter. The Court should have heard the case and ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, as the mistakes involving the date are inconsequential, especially given that all other aspects of the ballot were correct. Precedent supports this conclusion, with the Martin ruling emphasizing that, if biographical information errors were immaterial, non-biographical detail errors should be treated with greater leniency. Pennsylvania election law further supports this conclusion. Moreover, the voters should have been afforded the right to correct their ballots or cast provisional votes, particularly because they were protected under HAVA. For all such reasons, their votes fall within the protections of the Materiality Provision and should have been counted. If, in the future, the Supreme Court is once again presented with the Materiality Provision, the justices must not look away; rather, they need to define its scope and ensure voters are protected as it pertains to their fundamental right.