Soccer might be called the beautiful game, but off the field, the financial and legal game surrounding it is anything except beautiful. Over the past decade, fans have become increasingly dissatisfied with how regulatory and financial entities manipulate the sport, often prioritizing monopolistic control over the competitive integrity of their teams and leagues. As oligarchs and investment funds buy the world’s most historic teams and new billion-dollar leagues emerge, courts are in the principal position to protect soccer’s competitive landscape.

While most fans watch cases in the world’s biggest leagues like the English Premier League and Spain’s La Liga, high-stakes battles are occurring in developing markets like the United States, too. In global rankings, the U.S.’s biggest league, Major League Soccer (MLS), has risen significantly in global league rankings, ranked the MLS in 9th place by Opta Analyst as of October 2024, but it remains far from genuinely competing on the world stage. In comparison, the total market value of the English Premier League’s roster is roughly 10 times that of Major League Soccer’s. Even though soccer’s viewership in the United States has grown significantly in the past decade, a recent antitrust case, North American Soccer League v. United States Soccer Federation (2025), highlights how courts’ failure to hold regulatory bodies liable for monopolistic conduct can enable the manipulation of competition at the expense of emerging leagues in the United States, even if the bodies themselves do not directly compete in the relevant market. 

This case’s ruling, which denied the North American Soccer League (NASL)’s claims based on the lack of evidence of an explicit agreement between the United States Soccer Federation (USSF), MLS, and United Soccer League (USL), was a misapplication of antitrust law under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Respectively, these prohibit conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade and ban monopolization. The USSF’s role in gatekeeping divisional status distorts competition even absent the requirement of a trilateral conspiracy, which, as urged by the court in Little Rock Cardiology Clinic v. Baptist Health, is necessary to prove antitrust violations. The court in NASL v. USSF failed to recognize how regulatory bodies can monopolize markets without direct competition, contradicting key rulings such as Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Interstate Circuit v. United States. This shields the USSF from antitrust liability and overlooks the reality that soccer in the United States is vulnerable to the agenda of the regulatory body that oversees it.

The Structure of U.S. Soccer

Most global soccer federations implement a system of promotion and relegation between leagues. This means that a set number of successful teams in lower leagues will be promoted while, at the same time, an equal number of struggling teams in higher leagues are relegated. However, U.S. soccer does not have this feature. Instead, leagues are organized in a closed division system regulated by the governing body, the USSF, which sets minimum requirements for a league concerning the logistical and financial conditions of their teams. As the only Division 1 (D1) league, the MLS attracts significant investment, sponsorships, and new talent. Similarly, the USL is the only Division 2 (D2) league. Because the USSF controls this designation process, its decisions directly affect the viability and success of leagues. While the USSF presents itself as a neutral regulator, its selective enforcement of league standards which have established the MLS and USL’s continued dominance over D1 and D2 soccer presents fundamental antitrust concerns under Section 2 of the Sherman Act regarding what conditions a governing body should be able to prevent the market entry of competitors through entry standards for soccer in the United States.

The Case: NASL v. USSF

In 2011, after being resurrected from a former league under the same name (1968-1984), the North American Soccer League (NASL) was sanctioned by the USSF as a D2 league. However, after the USSF denied their application for D1 designation in 2016, multiple clubs left the NASL, leading to the league’s failure to meet the requirements of their D2 re-sanctioning application. Shortly after, they were driven out of business. In 2017, the NASL filed an antitrust lawsuit against the USSF and MLS, alleging their conspiracy to monopolize D1 soccer for the MLS and D2 professional soccer for the USL. Specifically, the NASL claimed that the USSF imposed standards and restricted competition to favor the MLS and USL. For example, the MSL received waivers for a 15,000-seat minimum standard for their stadiums, whereas NASL’s waiver requests were denied, blocking its D1 bid. Thus, the NASL’s case was not merely that the USSF’s standards blocked their entry into their D1 and D2 market, but it was specifically the USSF’s biased application of those standards that was anti-competitive and impeded their ability to attract business opportunities. However, citing Aquatherm Indus v. Fla. Power & Light Co., the court ruled in 2025 against the NASL since neither the MLS nor USSF competed in the relevant D2 market and therefore could not conspire to monopolize it. The ruling focused on the fact that the USSF was not a competitor in the D2 market, even though it played a decisive role in shaping the market as a governing body with authority over regulations and league designation. Though the NASL cited that multiple board members of the USSF were affiliated with MLS teams, the NASL could not prove that these board members significantly influenced the outcomes of sanctioning applications. Neither did they have direct evidence that the USL was part of a trilateral conspiracy with the USSF and MLS, which failed to meet the requirement set by Little Rock v. Baptist Health that at least one co-conspirator compete in the market. 

Misapplication of Antitrust Precedent

The first major flaw in the court’s ruling was the suggestion that the USSF could not conspire to monopolize the D2 market as a governing body. The court’s reliance on Aquatherm v. Florida Power & Light Company was misplaced and misconstrued the facts presented by the NASL. In that case, Aquatherm, a solar pool heating manufacturer, sued Florida Power & Light Company for antitrust claims concerning the false advertisement of electric pool heaters as the most cost-effective option. However, the defendant was not a competitor in the market for pool heaters in which Aquatherm operated. Since Aquatherm could not identify any specific co-conspirators who participated and benefited from the claims in the pool heater market, the result was that Aquatherm’s claims were baseless. However, unlike Aquatherm, where Florida Power & Light only influenced the market indirectly, the USSF directly controls market entry through its sanctioning authority, making it functionally closer to a monopolistic governing body rather than a passive market participant. While the actions of Florida Power & Light Company had an ambiguous effect on the market, the USSF’s denial of market entry for the NASL demonstrably undermined their business prospects. 

A relevant alternative to this misapplied precedent is Law v. NCAA, which the court failed to acknowledge. In that case, the court ruled that the NCAA’s restrictions on coaching salaries through regulatory power constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. It establishes that sports governing bodies like the USSF can still exert unlawful market control even if they are not traditional commercial entities. The NCAA, like the USSF, does not compete in the markets it regulates but was found liable for anti-competitive practices. NASL v. USSF presents an even more direct antitrust violation: the USSF is not just influencing wages or policies but controlling which leagues can exist in different divisions. However, by ignoring the fact that monopolization can be achieved through regulatory control, the court allows the USSF’s unfair conduct to persist.

The Unnecessary Requirement for a Trilateral Conspiracy

Furthermore, the requirement that the USL enter an explicit agreement with the USSF and MLS to establish market monopolization ignores a key precedent set by Interstate Circuit. v. United States that explicit agreements are not necessary for antitrust violations. This case suggests competitors can be considered part of an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act even without an agreement if circumstantial evidence reasonably suggests the restriction of competition and trade. Similar to how multiple motion picture film distributors imposed restrictions prohibiting the showing of films after their initial release without an explicit agreement in Interstate Circuit. v. United States, the USSF and MLS benefited the USL by imposing partisan standards that prevented the NASL from entering the market, even without the USL’s explicit agreement. This fact would invalidate the rationale of Little Rock v. Baptist Health, where the lack of a co-conspirator shielded the regulator from liability. Since the MLS and USL were both beneficiaries—and thus arguably co-conspirators—of the USSF’s biased application of sanctioning standards, antitrust scrutiny is legally valid. Under Interstate Circuit v. United States, the USL’s position as the sole competitor in the D2 market contradicts the court’s ruling. The focus on whether the USL actively conspired was misplaced. What matters under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is whether the actions of the USSF and MLS unreasonably restrained competition and established a monopoly for the USL.

Though the NASL could not offer evidence that a written agreement between the two parties took place, Interstate Circuit v. United States suggests that since they proposed circumstantial evidence of parallel conduct and biased rules enforcement, the court should have recognized the denial of the NASL’s D1 and D2 status as anti-competitive. Again, though neither the MSL nor NASL at certain points met the D1 requirement for hosting games in stadiums with 15,000 seats, the MLS received waivers while the NASL did not. Together with the fact that the MLS owned “Soccer United Marketing,” a licensing and advertising entity whose agreements with the USSF netted both participants revenue in the hundreds of millions, the possible incentives of selectively offering waivers are obvious. Since the USL benefited in their respective market just like the MLS, the USSF’s actions demonstrably violated the anti-conspiracy and anti-monopoly policies in Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 

Why the NASL’s Claims Failed 

It is important to note that late in the trial, the NASL suggested a second argument that was intended to prove the preceding fact that the USL’s participation in the conspiracy was not relevant for their USSF and MLS to have violated antitrust law. To do so, the NASL pointed to Volvo North America Corp. v. Men’s International Professional Tennis Council, which they claimed described a situation where the Men’s International Professional Tennis Council (MIPTC) conspired to monopolize the men’s professional tennis markets by favoring some tournaments over others. Since the MIPTC had not competed in the tournaments yet was still found to unlawfully limit competition, which was intended to prove that the USL’s involvement was irrelevant. However, the court decided this did not support the NASL’s argument that none of the co-conspirators needed to compete in the relevant market, as even under the Plaintiff’s precedent, liability requires an illegal agreement involving at least one entity that does compete in the market. The other precedent on this matter, Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., was rejected for the same reason.

Had the NASL instead presented Interstate Circuit. v. United States to prove that the USL’s market participation was legally relevant even without an explicit agreement, the court should have ruled consistently with antitrust precedent against the USSF. Although the NASL eventually argued that the trilateral conspiracy via the USL’s involvement was not relevant for antitrust to apply, the court interpreted this shift as inconsistent compared to the NASL’s pre-trial statement explicitly referring to USL as a co-conspirator, which unfortunately undermined an otherwise valid legal argument as seen in Interstate Circuit. v. United States.

Conclusion

Together, Law v. NCAA and Interstate Circuit. v. United States negate the necessity for an explicit trilateral agreement between the USSF, MLS, and USL to prove that the NASL was unlawfully prevented from becoming a D2 soccer league. Law v. NCAA suggests that even without direct market participation, the USSF, as a governing body, can impose unlawful constraints on competition. Further, Interstate Circuit. v. United States establishes that since the USL was able to maintain a monopoly over the D2 market, even if not explicitly agreeing to conspire, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were violated, which should have been recognized and addressed by the court. The current ruling sets a dangerous precedent that requires plaintiffs to prove the involvement of non-defendant conspirators. This undermines the Sherman Act and allows dominant entities like USSF and MLS to evade liability even when their actions stifle competitive markets, reducing consumer choice and league diversity.