“I’ve got a pen, and I’ve got a phone.”[1] President Barack Obama used this phrase as a metonymy for two actions he considered to be most effective for enacting change—the “pen” symbolizing his presidential capability to issue executive action, and the “phone” signifying his ability to mobilize public support during times of congressional deadlock. He used these dual actions across wide-ranging issues during his two terms, pertaining to economic, social, and environmental topics.
On June 15th of 2012, President Obama used his “pen” to implement a revolutionary measure which would redefine many aspects of the United States’ immigration policy and impact over 834,000 young U.S. immigrants’ lives in the years following its implementation.[2] Dubbed the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or more commonly referred to as DACA, this memorandum granted certain illegal immigrants, specifically those who were DREAMers and entered the U.S. illegally as children, a temporary halt from deportation along with permission to work. To justify this mass undertaking, Obama affirmed DACA’s existence as an application of “prosecutorial discretion,” insisting that in lieu of the current congressional inaction with the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, the executive branch has a duty to perform their own actions to address these pressing issues.[3] However, in doing so, President Obama’s rationalization brings up an imperative and essential question: To what extent can the executive branch solely reshape immigration policy? The program, and the court battles it proceeded to fuel, provide a revealing example of the push-and-pull between presidential capabilities and constitutional boundaries.
The U.S. Constitution autonomously grants legislative powers in the bicameral Congress and executive powers in the U.S. president, while granting judicial power in the Federal Judiciary. The system is also called the system of checks and balances and serves to prevent a single-branch rule by either branch of the federal government. However, this system does not address specific challenges to executive powers, particularly in scenarios where Congress fails to act on important matters. DACA stands as a clear example of this dilemma, as it followed decades of difficulties in passing the DREAM Act, and it represents a contemporary manifestation of the various ways that presidential power can simultaneously improve and weaken American government. Conclusively, although this program aims to address a pressing topic in American immigration and naturalization, it sheds light on the dangers of the executive branch’s overreach, emphasizing the necessity of the legislative branch to implement solutions to multifaceted policy issues.
The Legislative Vacuum: Immigration Reform and Presidential Frustration
Before considering whether DACA itself is constitutional, it is crucial to contextualize it by examining the background that resulted in its establishment. Prior to DACA’s creation in 2012, Congress had grappled with the topic of immigration for countless decades. The lack of action from the legislative branch has historically prompted the two other federal branches to compensate accordingly, setting key legal precedents around undocumented individuals in the courts; for example, in the 1982 case Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled that undocumented minors held the right to free, public education in the U.S., despite their immigration status.[4]
Perhaps one of the most notable examples of congressional deadlock and the absence of legislative action is exemplified by the 20 proposed versions of the DREAM Act. This bill aimed to effectively naturalize hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants who entered the United States as youth.[5] Despite the continued attempts to pass this act, the DREAM Act failed to pass both houses of Congress, with its closest vote occurring in 2010, nine years after its creation; the bill passed the House of Republicans, but, due to a Republican filibuster, failed to collect the 60 votes necessary to pass the Senate.[6]
President Obama, a former constitutional law professor, initially expressed skepticism about acting unilaterally.[7] In October of 2010, he told reporters, “I am president, I am not king. We have a system of government that requires Congress to work with the executive branch to make it happen. [I am] committed to making it happen, but I [have to] have some partners to do it.”[8] However, two years later and amidst his re-election campaign, President Obama changed course, announcing DACA as a form of “deferred action,” in immigration enforcement that allows officials to prioritize whom to deport while also giving grace to individuals who have grown up in the U.S. and can contribute to the U.S. economically.[9] While DACA does not grant legal status, it provides significant benefits, including the ability to work legally for two-year increments, receive a social security number, and access essential social services, including Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) health insurance.[10]
President Obama’s administration argued that DACA as a program was not creating new laws or conferring legal status; instead, it was simply exercising prosecutorial discretion by choosing not to deport a specific category of individuals. However, DACA extends beyond a simple non-enforcement decision, as it came with work permits, social security eligibility, and a renewable two-year protection for participants. Critics of the program were quick to challenge this expansive use of discretion and raised concerns about its constitutional legitimacy.
Legal and Constitutional Challenges
The basis of this constitutional debate rests on a discussion of the balance of power between Congress and the Executive Branch. In Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, the framers of the document grant Congress authority to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” making immigration policy a matter of legislative action.[11] Conversely, in Article II, Section 3, the president is tasked with “[taking] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”[12] So now, the question becomes: Does DACA symbolize a faithful execution of law, or does it rewrite it instead?
This question is a contentiously debated topic between legal academics and judges. Supporters of DACA justify the Obama administration’s actions as merely determining how to enforce immigration policy with limited resources in the face of the congressional deadlock centered around the DREAM Act. Contrarily, points also stand regarding possible overreach, as, according to Justice Robert H. Jackson’s view in the 1952 case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, presidential power is at its “lowest ebb” when it contravenes the stance of Congress.[13] Still, Congress did not pass a law withholding deferred action to DREAMers in so many words—they had simply not voted on the DREAM Act. Thus, DACA’s proponents contended that the program addressed a policy vacuum left by congressional inaction.
But to its opponents, DACA is discretion taken a step too far—it is, they argue, de facto law.[14] In the 2015 case Texas v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals declared that the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents Program (DAPA), a similar program to DACA, was unconstitutional based on the fact that the Obama administration had not followed the notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).[15] The APA mandates that federal agencies, in making policy, must adhere to a particular process in order to prevent an abuse of executive power, including allowing “interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”[16] In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that the Obama administration had avoided this process, and a later case in 2022 contended that DAPA additionally contradicted the Immigration and Naturalization Act.[17] In addition, both cases contended that the application of DAPA was in violation of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution due to an overreach of power regarding certain liberties to such a wide demographic of illegal immigrants.[18]
These rulings suggest that while deferred action may be used in individual cases, the executive branch instituting a formal program that grants these permissions en masse crosses the boundaries outlined in the Constitution. It is the widespread scale and system of DACA—not prosecutorial discretion itself—that raises constitutional alarms. However, Former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, who signed the DACA directive on June 15, 2012, asserts the opposite, emphasizing the fact that DACA does not guarantee legal “immigration status or a pathway to citizenship,”[19] as those rights stay in the hands of Congress. Napolitano argues that DACA simply embodies the duties of the executive branch and their use of “resources within the framework of existing law.”[20]
The contrasting opinions of officials on the constitutionality of DACA and the scope of executive power create a unique dilemma between the president’s administration and Congress—and subsequently create an opening for the federal judiciary to rule on the legality of these policies.
The Role of the Judiciary
Since DACA’s conception in 2012, federal courts have played an integral role in deciding the program’s fate, emphasizing the system of checks and balances constructed by the Constitution, as the courts serve as a constitutional brake on the executive branch. From the first moments of its creation, DACA has not only faced a barrage of lawsuits but has also become a volatile policy based on the composition of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches at a given time. Perhaps most crucial in shaping the stance on presidential action regarding immigration reform has been the case Texas v. United States, where the verdict was centered around the question of whether the Obama administration’s use of prosecutorial discretion when conceiving DACA falls outside the bounds of executive action.
On September 5, 2017, President Trump’s administration announced the beginning of DACA’s termination, which would cut off access to the program for over 800,000 individuals and prevent many more hundreds of thousands of people from applying. During this statement, Attorney General Jeff Sessions declared DACA an “open-ended circumvention of immigration laws,” which was “an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the executive branch.”[21] However, the decision instigated several lawsuits from both states and immigrant rights organizations. In 2020, the Supreme Court blocked this termination in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. Their verdict was not based on the constitutional grounds of DACA’s dissolution, but was decided on due to the Department of Homeland Security’s failure to adequately justify their course of action under administrative law, violating the Administrative Procedure Act.[22] The Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Regents of the University of California, with the majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts. Justice Roberts avoided weighing in on the legality of DACA as a program, writing that the Court does “not decide whether DACA or its rescission are sound policies,” as they “address only whether the agency complied with the procedural requirement.”[23]
However, more recent rulings have directly addressed the question of DACA’s constitutionality. In 2021, a Texas federal judge within the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that DACA went beyond the constitutional authority of the president and violated mandatory administrative procedures that must be followed when issuing executive orders.[24] Similarly to the ruling with DAPA, the court found that DACA failed to follow both the APA and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution; specifically, the plaintiffs argued that “the Executive cannot exercise such legislative power—it cannot dispense with statutes addressing unlawful presence by declaring a class of aliens to henceforth be present lawfully.”[25] While current DACA recipients remain protected following the verdict, the ruling bars any new applicants from being accepted, leaving the future of the program uncertain.
Between the ruling of the Supreme Court and the verdicts of smaller federal courts, although addressing two separate issues within DACA’s existence as a program, the vastly differing views highlight the complexity of ensuring executive power is within its constitutional constraints. Although the president may need the ability to interpret constitutional duties, such as the Take Care Clause, when enforcing the law, courts also have a constitutional obligation to examine whether that flexibility oversteps into legislative action.
Historical Precedent: Executive Power in Crisis
To understand the broader implications of DACA, it is helpful to situate it within the historical evolution of presidential power. The American presidency has always oscillated between restraint and expansion, many times occurring in times of national crisis or congressional issues. In the 19th century, President Andrew Jackson famously defied the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, choosing to carry out the forced removal of the Cherokee and using unilateral power from the executive branch to ignore judicial verdicts.[26] During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus due to his insistence that desperate times called for desperate measures, raising protest from Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney, who asserted that Congress had the power to suspend habeas corpus, not the executive branch.[27] More recently, in the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs dangerously teetered across a line of executive economic intervention.[28]
Among the long list of executive actions taken by President Roosevelt, several noteworthy cases illustrate how potential presidential overreach has been addressed by the judiciary. Two key cases showcase the paths taken to override an executive order. The first, Panama Oil Co v. Ryan, argued that presidential interference in the proceedings of private businesses constitutes an overreach exceeding the bounds of executive power.[29] The second, Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, overturned an executive order on the basis of states’ rights.[30] Arguably more impactful than the legal ruling of Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States is the role that public opinion played in President Roosevelt’s response; though initially vocal in his dissatisfaction with the ruling, Roosevelt later stepped away from protest, understanding the potential detriment to his overall agenda. As this historical background pertains to DACA, it is important to note that public perception of both executive orders and its judicial response can promote the survival of the order in question.
DACA fits within this broader trend of executive action, as its intentions were to fill the void left by a gridlocked Congress that was conflicted over the DREAM Act. But, regardless of the intention and problem that this program targeted, it brings up crucial concerns about democratic legitimacy and the erosion of checks and balances within the federal government.
This struggle between the power balance of the executive and legislative branches is not a new issue in American government. There have been many presidents throughout the nation’s history who have been faced with the decision of whether or not to act unilaterally when Congress faces gridlock. But the advent of DACA signals a fundamental shift in the manner in which executive power has been wielded, raising the question of when executive action oversteps into the duties assigned to the legislature.
The Human Stakes: Policy, People, and the Limits of Law
DACA cannot be analyzed without considering the humanitarian impact of its existence. For hundreds of thousands of recipients, it has become a lifeline, allowing immigrants to work, study, and live without a constant fear of deportation. Many participants sponsored by this program have gone on to contribute to American society, whether that be through teaching, serving in the military, working in medicine, or studying at a university to become the next generation of the workforce.[31] In many respects, the people involved with DACA embody the American ideal of opportunity and embodiment of the American ideal of meritocracy and opportunity, as they have contributed to the U.S.’s economy and society.
The emphasis on DACA as having a moral imperative has also found support among legal scholars and practitioners. The Yale Journal on Regulation argues that inequitable access to gainful employment based on immigration status produces two undesirable outcomes: (1) the creation of a “caste system,” with (2) little to no demonstrated impact on curbing illegal immigration.[32] Moreover, it has also been argued that the executive branch is uniquely positioned to serve as the most efficient route to enacting sweeping change, contending that change in the legislative and judiciary branches moves incrementally and at the expense of unified/consistent policy.[33]
Considering this factor complicates the legal and constitutional analysis of DACA, and subsequently brings into focus the question of balancing constitutionality with humane compassion. However, it is crucial to note that positive outcomes do not inherently justify a breach of the provisions outlined in the nation’s founding documents. The dilemma that DACA faces realistically sheds light on the plight of DREAMers and underscores the failure of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform through the DREAM Act.[34] The executive branch may act out of necessity, but durable, complete solutions must come from the legislature rather than presidential fiat.
Conclusion: DACA and the Constitutional Future of Executive Power
DACA’s inception and conflicted story is one built on noble intentions but executed through constitutionally dubious means. It reflects a broader trend in modern governance: as Congress deadlocks, presidents act. The debate over DACA does not simply concern immigration—it extends beyond, bringing up the nature of the executive power in the United States’ constitutional democracy.
Broadly speaking, Congress’s continued inability to properly address immigration reform underscores a deeply rooted dysfunction within the legislative branch. DACA’s status quo and controversy attest to the fact that the United States’ immigration system is altogether flawed and requires a comprehensive long-term solution; it cannot be so that the law’s failure to adapt has created a normalcy where executive action becomes a form of policy by default.
Conclusively, DACA’s continued controversy should prompt more than just a judicial review: it should catalyze legislative action. The Constitution, which outlines the founding ideals of the United States government, asserts that Congress, not the president, holds the power to develop immigration law. Until Congress fulfills that role and makes progress on acts that have been proposed relentlessly, future presidents will be tempted to follow in President Obama’s path, putting both legal backlash and constitutional erosion at risk.
DACA’s legacy is twofold: it emphasizes both the moral urgency of immigration reform and the constitutional limits of presidential ambition. For the United States to honor both its laws and its ideals, it must find a path where compassion and constitutionalism converge rather than collide.
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[18]State of Texas v. The United States of America, No. 15-40238, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. May 26, 2015). Accessed April 26, 2025. https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/15-40238/15-40238-2015-05-26.pdf?ts=1432668631.
[19] Janet Napolitano, “The Truth About Young Immigrants and DACA,” The New York Times, New York Times Company, last modified November 30, 2016, accessed April 26, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/opinion/the-truth-about-young-immigrants-and-daca.html.
[20]Napolitano, “The Truth,” The New York Times.
[21]Scott Bomboy, “Trump administration ends DACA program as court battles loom,” National Constitution Center, last modified September 5, 2017, accessed April 26, 2025, https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/trump-administration-ends-daca-program-as-court-battles-loom.
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[23]Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, No. 18-587, slip op. at 34 (June 18, 2020). Accessed April 26, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/18-587/case.pdf.
[24]State of Texas v. The United States of America, 575 F. (5th Cir. July 16, 2021). Accessed April 26, 2025. https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/executive-management/2021/TexasVUSDACA.pdf.
[25]State of Texas v. The United States of America, 575 F. 73 (5th Cir. July 16, 2021). Accessed April 26, 2025. https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/executive-management/2021/TexasVUSDACA.pdf.
[26]The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, ed., “Worcester v. Georgia,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified February 24, 2025, accessed April 26, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Worcester-v-Georgia.
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[34]American Immigration Council, “The Dream,” American Immigration Council.