The Central Mediterranean route is the deadliest migration route, with an estimated 24,000 deaths and disappearances since 2014.¹ This route gained prominence in the mid-1990s, as thousands left the Northern coast of Africa in the hopes of reaching Europe. The Central Mediterranean route is most commonly taken from Libya to Italy, though migrants also sometimes depart from Tunisia and Egypt.² It is important to note that many of these migrants are not from Libya, Tunisia, or Egypt, meaning that they have already undertaken an arduous journey by land before attempting to cross the sea. 

One of the reasons this passage is so dangerous is because the boats used for the journey are unsuitable for navigation on high seas. The boats used are often wooden or inflatable, usually overcrowded, lacking sufficient fuel, and thus very likely to capsize.³ Migrants also face dire conditions at sea, with the possibility of not having adequate shelter, food, and water in hazardous conditions at sea, further putting them at risk. According to the International Organization for Migration, over 95% of the deaths at sea, however, are a result of drowning. ⁴

The European Union (EU) has sought to deal with this influx of refugees and migrants from the Mediterranean by funding the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept these migrants, in what was known as the the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (2017).⁵ Following this agreement, the EU did in fact see a reduction in arrivals, though it is unclear if this is a true reduction in the number of departures, a result of the Memorandum, or an increase in deaths at sea.⁶ The Libyan Coast Guard frequently intercepts migrant boats at sea and brings migrants back to Libya, where they are faced with gross human rights violations, including being detained, sold into slavery, raped, or forcefully deported.⁷ Additionally, EU fact-finding reports have found that the Libyan Coast Guard cooperates with smugglers and is involved in the trafficking of migrants, implying that the same people who are intercepted at sea by Libyan Coast Guards might also have had their journey facilitated by them, and are also profiting off of this trafficking.⁸ Because of this, the fact that the EU is funding the Libyan Coast Guard puts into question the EU’s commitment to international refugee and human rights standards, as they are routinely putting migrant lives at risk. 

Because of this, many NGOs, namely Sea-Watch, SOS Humanity, and SOS Méditerranée, among others, have begun rescuing  migrants at sea. These organizations conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) operations within the framework of international maritime law. They perform these operations with the cooperation of maritime authorities and the Coast Guards of southern European states. These NGOs play an essential role in reducing the deaths of migrants at sea and also safeguarding their human rights, as they must drop them off in a “place of safety” (POS) according to international law—Europe.⁹ NGOs will not return migrants to Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt, as these states are not recognized as a POS, where the human rights of migrants will be guaranteed, in contrast to the endeavors of the Libyan Coast Guard, which seek to bring migrants back to an unsafe country. 

The EU’s policy of sending migrants back to Libya goes against the legal precedent set by Vos Thalassa, which established that non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international law. The case made it clear that SAR obligations under maritime law are closely tied to human rights protections, meaning that migrants should not be returned to places where they face serious risks like torture, abuse, and forced detention. However, the EU continues to avoid its legal responsibilities by relying on Libya to handle migration, taking advantage of loopholes in SAR policies to justify stricter border control measures. I will argue that to remedy this issue, the EU needs to create a clear legal definition of a Place of Safety (POS) that excludes unsafe countries like Libya and ensure that all member states share responsibility for migrant arrivals more fairly to prevent further violations of non-refoulement.

1. Legal Framework

The legal obligations concerning maritime search and rescue (SAR), assistance to those in distress at sea, and protection from refoulement are underpinned by several international and regional legal instruments. These instruments establish a framework for ensuring safety at sea and upholding human rights, irrespective of nationality or legal status. The following overviews the primary conventions and principles relevant to the obligations and practices in SAR and non-refoulement contexts.

1. The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention, 1979)

The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention, 1979), also known as the Hamburg Convention, establishes a coordinated framework for search and rescue (SAR) operations at sea.¹⁰ It obligates coastal states to: first, respond to distress signals promptly, regardless of the nationality or status of those in danger; second, coordinate SAR operations within designated zones, which extend beyond territorial waters into international waters; and third, ensure rescued individuals are taken to a “Place of Safety” (POS) where they are no longer at risk and can receive humanitarian assistance.¹¹

However, the SAR Convention fails to address situations where the state responsible for a rescue is unsafe. This is particularly relevant in the Central Mediterranean, where Libya’s large SAR zone places many rescues under the jurisdiction of a state that has been widely condemned for its systematic human rights abuses against migrants.¹² The Libyan Coast Guard, funded and trained by the EU under the Italy-Libya Memorandum (2017), has repeatedly intercepted migrant vessels and forcibly returned individuals to arbitrary detention, forced labor, sexual violence, and torture.¹³

This raises a critical legal question: What constitutes a Place of Safety (POS) under international maritime law? Should a POS be defined narrowly as a location where rescued individuals will physically survive? Or should it encompass broader human rights protections, ensuring that those rescued are not returned to conditions where they face persecution, torture, or other inhumane treatment?

The lack of a clear, binding definition has allowed states to adopt restrictive interpretations, arguing that a POS need only provide immediate survival, regardless of long-term risks to fundamental rights. This narrow reading creates a dangerous legal loophole, enabling governments to manipulate SAR obligations for political ends. Instead of prioritizing humanitarian responsibilities, states can claim compliance with international law while effectively exposing migrants and asylum seekers to serious harm.

Moreover, the SAR Convention does not provide an enforcement mechanism, leaving states free to determine what qualifies as a POS based on their political interests rather than legal principles. This ambiguity has been used to justify returning rescued individuals to unsafe environments, undermining both the spirit and purpose of maritime rescue obligations. If a POS is interpreted without regard for human rights standards, SAR operations risk becoming a tool for migration deterrence rather than a safeguard for those distressed at sea.

Thus, while the SAR Convention establishes a framework for rescue operations, its failure to explicitly define the legal threshold for a POS has led to inconsistent state practices, allowing non-refoulement obligations to be circumvented under the pretense of SAR compliance.

2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982)

UNCLOS is often referred to as the “constitution of the oceans” and provides a comprehensive legal framework for maritime governance and codifies the maritime duty to  assist those in distress at sea.¹⁴

Article 98 of UNCLOS mandates that every state requires masters of ships flying their flag to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost, regardless of their nationality or circumstances. Additionally, “flag” states are responsible for ensuring that their vessels comply with this duty and cooperate with coastal states to facilitate SAR operations.¹⁵ Like the SAR Convention, UNCLOS underscores that the obligation to assist is a humanitarian duty embedded in maritime tradition and law.

3. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter)

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines the rights and freedoms applicable to all individuals within the European Union, including those engaged in SAR contexts.¹⁶ Two provisions in the EU Charter are particularly relevant to non-refoulement and SAR operations. First is enshrined in Article 18—the right to asylum. The EU Charter establishes the right to seek asylum to anyone in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention.¹⁷ Additionally, the EU Charter establishes the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment in Article 19. This prohibits the expulsion, extradition, or return (refoulement) of any individual to a state where they face a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment.¹⁸ These provisions align with international human rights norms and emphasize the obligation of EU member states to ensure that rescued individuals are not returned to places where their lives or freedoms are at risk.

4. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948)

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, is a foundational document in international human rights law. It sets out a comprehensive vision of the fundamental rights and freedoms inherent to all individuals, irrespective of nationality, race, religion, gender, or other statuses.¹⁹ The principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits states from returning individuals to a place where they may face persecution, torture, or inhuman treatment, finds implicit support within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Although the UDHR does not explicitly mention non-refoulement, its provisions provide a strong foundation for the principle by emphasizing the protection of human dignity and fundamental freedoms.²⁰ Many of these principles are also stated in the aforementioned legal doctrines. 

Firstly, in Article 3, the UDHR establishes the right to life, liberty, and security. This article underscores the fundamental right of every individual to live free from threats to their life and safety.²¹ Returning individuals to a country where they face persecution or violence directly contravenes this right. Article 5 establishes the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.²² Non-refoulement aligns with this principle by ensuring that individuals are not returned to situations where they would face such violations. Finally, Article 14 of the UDHR explicitly recognizes the right of individuals to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution.²³ While it does not guarantee asylum, it affirms the responsibility of states to consider the dangers faced by asylum seekers and to provide protection against forced returns to unsafe conditions.

The UDHR’s emphasis on protecting life, freedom from persecution, and the right to dignity establishes a moral and legal basis for the principle of non-refoulement. It has inspired subsequent international instruments, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which explicitly codify the principle. Furthermore, the UDHR’s universal appeal strengthens non-refoulement as a normative standard applicable to all individuals, irrespective of nationality, legal status, or circumstances.

5. Additional Instances of Non-Refoulement in International Law

Non-refoulement—or the prohibition of the return of individuals to territories where they would face persecution, torture, or other serious harm—is embedded in several key instruments. Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention protects refugees from being returned to a country where they would face threats to their life or freedom. Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture extends the non-refoulement principle to all persons, prohibiting their return to a state where they risk torture. Non-refoulement is widely recognized as a norm of customary international law, binding on all states regardless of treaty ratification.

The SAR Convention, UNCLOS, and the EU Charter provide a robust legal framework for ensuring safety at sea and protecting the rights of those rescued. However, implementing  these obligations, particularly in cases involving migrants and asylum seekers, often encounters political and logistical challenges. Ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement is critical in upholding international law and safeguarding human rights, even amidst complex SAR operations.

2. The Case of the Vos Thalassa

On July 8, 2018, a tugboat, the Vos Thalassa, called the Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC), informing them that the Vos Thalassa had rescued approximately 60 migrants from a wooden boat in distress at sea in the Libyan Search and Rescue zone. Initially, the captain of the tugboat received no response from Libyan authorities, so the MRCC in Rome instructed the ship to proceed to the island of Lampedusa.²⁴ A couple hours later however, the captain of the Vos Thalassa received feedback from the Libyan Coast Guard to proceed back to the Libyan Coast and return the rescued migrants to Libya. ²⁵

One of the migrants, equipped with a smartphone, realized that the boat was heading south, back towards Libya. This led to a state of panic among the migrants on the boat, leading to what was perceived by the crew of the ship as violent actions.²⁶ The court transcripts describe these actions: migrants made a gesture of slitting their throats;put on life jackets and threw themselves overboard;and gestured that they would throw others overboard. It is unclear from the court transcripts whether these were gestures of distress or of threats.²⁷ Eventually however, the captain of the ship, fearing for his crew’s safety, turned the ship back around towards Italy and notified the MRCC in Rome, and they sent an MRCC naval interception to bring the migrants to the Italian coast.²⁸ 

The defendants of this case were two ‘ringleaders,’ who are described as the most violent of the migrants, as well as the two who created the panic on the ship, and prompted the other migrants to protest when the ship was headed towards Libya. They were charged with crimes of violence against public officials. The third co-defendant was the captain of the ship, who was charged with aiding and abetting irregular migration. 

The rulings of the court established that, first and foremost, Libya is not a place of safety. As such, the violence of these migrants was justified, as they were acting in self-defense in order to protect their rights. Moreover, the decision of the Libyan Coast Guard to return migrants to Libya conflicts with international maritime law, as Libya is not a POS. Finally, the judge established that the Italy-Libya memorandum was not considered to be binding in a court of law, as it also conflicts with international law. All three defendants were acquitted. 

3. The Vos Thalassa as a Case Study for Non-Refoulement

The Vos Thalassa case is a compelling example of the intersection of international maritime law, human rights law, and state sovereignty, particularly in migrant rescue operations. The Italian-flagged vessel acted under the legal obligations set forth by the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These frameworks mandate the rescue of individuals in distress at sea, irrespective of their nationality, status, or the circumstances leading to their situation. Additionally, these conventions require that rescued individuals be delivered to a POS where their immediate needs can be met and their safety ensured.

However, the definition of a POS has often been a point of contention, particularly in cases involving migrants and asylum seekers. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) guidelines emphasize that a place of safety must be a location where survivors are no longer at risk of harm and can access essential services. In this case, disputes arose because returning the rescued migrants to Libya, their point of departure would have likely subjected them to severe harm, including torture, inhuman treatment, and other human rights violations.²⁹ These risks invoked the principle of non-refoulement, a cornerstone of international human rights and refugee law, which prohibits returning individuals to territories where they face a real risk of persecution or cruel treatment. 

Moreover, the ruling links a POS with human rights, stating that a POS must be a location where human rights are guaranteed. By doing so, the court effectively expanded the traditional understanding of SAR obligations to incorporate human rights considerations. This interpretation underscores that maritime obligations cannot be fulfilled in isolation from broader human rights norms, particularly in cases involving vulnerable individuals such as asylum seekers or migrants fleeing persecution. This expansion is legally supported by the principle of systemic integration, which requires treaties to be interpreted in harmony with broader international human rights obligations.³⁰ In the Vos Thalassa case, returning the rescued migrants to Libya was deemed incompatible with the notion of a POS given the well-documented risks of arbitrary detention, abuse, and other human rights violations faced by migrants in Libya. This decision should, in theory, set a precedent for interpreting maritime obligations in a manner that aligns with international human rights law, reinforcing the universality of non-refoulement across legal domains.

From an international law perspective, the judicial outcomes and reasoning in the Vos Thalassa case are significant, as they reflect an evolving interpretation of legal norms at the intersection of maritime obligations and human rights protections. The case highlights the broader legal implications of jus cogens norms in shaping state conduct.

Jus cogens norms are peremptory principles of international law that hold the highest status, binding all states regardless of treaty obligations and permitting no derogation. In the Vos Thalassa case, the judge implicitly acknowledges non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm by recognizing that returning individuals to Libya, where they would face torture, inhumane treatment, and other severe human rights violations, would violate fundamental principles of international law that admit no derogation. This recognition reinforces the notion that non-refoulement is not merely a treaty-based obligation found in instruments like the 1951 Refugee Convention or the Convention Against Torture, but a universal standard that must guide state action under all circumstances. By framing the return to Libya as a direct violation of human dignity and fundamental rights, the court situates non-refoulement alongside other absolute prohibitions in international law, such as the bans on torture and slavery, reinforcing its non-derogable (meaning something cannot be infringed on, even in an emergency) status under jus cogens, strengthening its legal authority and reinforces the principle’s universality. 

4. Empirical Results of Non-Refoulement

In 2020, nearly 12,000 migrants and refugees were forcibly returned to Libya while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. By the first quarter of 2021, the number had already surpassed 4,000.³¹ This troubling trend highlights a disturbing pattern of European Union (EU) collaboration with Libyan authorities to intercept and return migrants, despite the severe risks and human rights abuses they face upon their return. According to Amnesty International, over the past five years, more than 82,000 people have been intercepted at sea and sent back to Libya, where they endure arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, forced labor, and even unlawful killings.³² Instead of addressing this crisis, the Libyan Government of National Unity has continued to facilitate these abuses, as evidenced by the appointment of Mohamed al-Khoja as director of the Department for Combating Illegal Migration, an individual known to further the oppression of migrants.³³

This practice of returning migrants to Libya directly contradicts the principles set out in the Vos Thalassa case and its broader implications for international law. The Vos Thalassa case, which highlighted the integration of human rights protections into maritime law, firmly established that individuals rescued at sea must not be returned to places where they face a real risk of torture, inhuman treatment, or death. It underscored that the concept of a “place of safety” within maritime law must go beyond mere physical safety and include protecting individuals’ human rights. This judicial reasoning recognizes  that non-refoulement—an established principle of international law—is a fundamental human rights obligation that must take precedence over state interests or national borders.

The EU’s continued practice of returning migrants to Libya blatantly undermines non-refoulement, despite overwhelming evidence of torture, persecution, and human rights abuses faced by returnees. By supporting Libyan interceptions, European states disregarded their legal duty to protect individuals in distress at sea, directly contradicting the Vos Thalassa precedent, which prioritized human dignity over political or logistical concerns.

The implications of this ongoing practice are profound, both from a legal and humanitarian standpoint. Legally, the EU’s actions run counter to the evolving interpretation of international law and undermine the legitimacy of international law. The case reaffirmed the importance of integrating human rights considerations into maritime operations, and the principle of non-refoulement was recognized as a jus cogens norm, binding on all states and overriding national interests. By continuing to return migrants to Libya, the EU not only disregards these human rights obligations but also undermines the authority and effectiveness of international law.

Furthermore, the EU’s actions set a dangerous precedent for how states can circumvent international law in the name of migration control. By failing to act in accordance with the Vos Thalassa precedent, the EU risks legitimizing policies prioritizing border enforcement over  human rights protection, thereby weakening the protections afforded to vulnerable individuals under international law. This could have wide-reaching consequences, leading to further erosion of the safeguards against refoulement and the protection of asylum seekers globally.

Critics argue that strict border enforcement policies, including cooperation with Libya, are necessary to deter irregular migration and prevent loss of life at sea. The EU has defended its collaboration with the Libyan Coast Guard on the grounds of border control, deterrence, and security, as a way to combat smuggling networks and maintain regional stability.³⁴ However, this argument fails to acknowledge that such policies have not reduced overall migration but have forced individuals into more dangerous, clandestine routes, increasing mortality rates.³⁵ Furthermore, prioritizing enforcement over human rights obligations contradicts both international legal commitments and the EU’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The situation also has significant humanitarian consequences. The individuals returned to Libya are subjected to some of the most extreme and systematic human rights abuses, including torture, sexual violence, and forced labor.³⁶ These individuals, many of whom are seeking refuge from conflict or persecution, are placed in perilous situations that threaten their lives and dignity. Instead of being granted the safety and protection they are entitled to under international law, they are exposed to further violence and exploitation. This not only violates their basic human rights but also undermines the very purpose of international migration frameworks, which are designed to provide protection to individuals fleeing life-threatening conditions.

5. Alternatives & Recommendations

A more structured and accountable solution must be implemented to address the issue of forced returns to Libya and ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement.³⁷ First, the legal definition of a “safe harbor” or “place of safety” should be strengthened to ensure that it explicitly prohibits returning individuals to countries where they face the risk of torture, inhumane treatment, or other human rights violations. As established in the SAR convention, the definition of a POS is not explicitly stated, allowing room for interpretation. In the case of Libya, where migrants are at risk of arbitrary detention, forced labor, sexual violence, and even death, the return of individuals should not be permitted under any circumstances. The “place of safety” must be legally recognized as a location where individuals are guaranteed protection from such abuses. 

Second, responsibility for the disembarkation and processing of migrants rescued at sea must be distributed more evenly across EU member states. Currently, Italy and Greece bear the overwhelming responsibility for accepting rescued migrants, which leads to the forced return of individuals to Libya, a practice that is incompatible with the principle of non-refoulement. The EU should introduce a mandatory, fair distribution system that ensures countries like France and Spain also share the responsibility of taking in migrants, thus reducing the pressure on frontline states and preventing the illegal practice of refoulement.

There are several advantages to this solution. First, it ensures that the human rights of migrants are respected by guaranteeing that they are not returned to Libya, where they would face grave risks. By establishing a clearer legal framework for what constitutes a POS, the EU can better protect individuals from being sent back to unsafe conditions. Additionally, dispersing responsibility across EU member states would ease the burden on countries like Italy and Greece, reducing their need to return migrants to Libya out of logistical or political necessity. However, there are some potential drawbacks. One concern states might have is that a more distributed system of responsibility might inadvertently encourage migration, as individuals may believe that they have a higher chance of being safely resettled in the EU. Additionally, logistical challenges and the cost of coordinating the relocation of migrants between EU countries could strain resources, particularly in the short term.

Nevertheless, this solution is optimal because it balances humanitarian principles, such as non-refoulement, with the practicalities of managing migration. By ensuring that migrants are not returned to Libya, where they face serious human rights violations, and by fairly distributing responsibility for their reception, the EU can better uphold its international obligations. This approach reduces the likelihood of refoulement, alleviates pressure on Italy and Greece, and ensures that the rights of migrants are respected across the EU, fostering a more just and efficient migration system.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, the European Union’s current practice of returning migrants to Libya stands in stark contrast to the precedent set by the Vos Thalassa case. By continuing to forcibly return individuals to Libya, where they face severe human rights violations, the EU is violating its legal obligations under international law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement. This practice undermines both the spirit and letter of the legal commitments made by states to uphold human rights, as well as their responsibilities under the Vos Thalassa ruling. The case affirmed that individuals in distress at sea must not be returned to a place where they face the risk of torture, inhuman treatment, or death, underscoring that the protection of human rights must take precedence over political or logistical concerns. In light of this, the EU’s actions risk eroding the integrity of international law and diminishing its commitment to safeguarding the most vulnerable individuals, particularly those seeking refuge.

The implications of the EU’s continued support for the return of migrants to Libya are profound. It undermines the credibility of European states’ commitment to human rights and weakens the protection mechanisms that are essential for those in distress at sea. As the international community grapples with the complexities of migration, the Vos Thalassa case offers an important reminder that international law must prioritize the safety and dignity of individuals, especially in politically sensitive contexts. The EU must reassess its approach to migration control, ensuring that its actions align with the fundamental humanitarian principles that underlie international law, especially the prohibition of refoulement. This would not only protect the rights of migrants but also restore the credibility of EU policies, aligning them with the international obligations to protect those in distress.

The solution to this issue lies in strengthening the legal definition of a POS, ensuring that such places are free from the risk of human rights violations, like those present in Libya. Additionally, a fairer distribution of responsibility for the disembarkation of rescued migrants across EU member states would reduce the strain on countries like Italy and Greece, preventing them from feeling forced to return migrants to unsafe locations. By dispersing responsibility, the EU could alleviate the pressures on frontline states and ensure that more countries share in the responsibility of providing protection to those in need.

This solution is not without its challenges, including potential moral hazards and the logistical burden of coordinating the relocation of migrants. However, it is ultimately the most effective way to ensure that migrants’ human rights are upheld while maintaining the practical management of migration within the EU. By distributing responsibility more equitably, the EU can avoid the forced return of migrants to Libya and other unsafe countries, ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement.

Ultimately, the Vos Thalassa case provides an important framework for understanding the intersection of maritime law, human rights law, and state sovereignty. The ruling reinforces the idea that states must reconcile their migration policies with their obligations to protect human rights, even in politically sensitive areas. By integrating the principle of non-refoulement into the operational framework of maritime search and rescue operations and recognizing its jus cogens status, the case set a critical precedent for the protection of individuals in distress at sea. Moving forward, the EU must ensure that its actions reflect this commitment, both in treating migrants and in its overall approach to migration policy. By aligning state practices with universal human rights standards, the global legal order can strengthen its protection mechanisms, ultimately upholding the safety and dignity of individuals fleeing danger.

Notes

1. Missing Migrants Project, Int’l Org. for Migration, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean ↩︎
2. Missing Migrants Project, Int’l Org. for Migration, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean ↩︎
3.  Search and Rescue Operations, SOS Méditerranée, https://www.sosmediterranee.org/understand-the-operations/ ↩︎
4. Missing Migrants Project, Int’l Org. for Migration, https://missingmigrants.iom.int ↩︎
5. Memorandum of Understanding on Migration Between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of National Accord of Libya, It.-Libya, Feb. 2, 2017, https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MEMORANDUM_IT_LIBIA.pdf. ↩︎
6. Missing Migrants Project, Int’l Org. for Migration, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean ↩︎
7. Libya: EU Conditions Remain Hellish as EU Marks 5 Years of Cooperation Agreements, Amnesty Int’l (Jan. 2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/. ↩︎
8. Alice Speri, The E.U. Is Still Sending Migrants to Libya to Suffer, Foreign Pol’y (July 4, 2023), https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/04/migrant-sea-rescue-mediterranean-libyan-coast-guard/. ↩︎
9. Search and Rescue Operations, SOS Méditerranée, https://www.sosmediterranee.org/understand-the-operations/ ↩︎
10.  Int’l Convention on Maritime Search & Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 118. ↩︎
11.  Int’l Convention on Maritime Search & Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 118. ↩︎
12. Search and Rescue Operations, SOS Méditerranée, https://www.sosmediterranee.org/understand-the-operations/ ↩︎
13. Int’l Convention on Maritime Search & Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 118. ↩︎
14. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. ↩︎
15. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. ↩︎
16.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. ↩︎
17. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 18, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. ↩︎
18. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 19, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. ↩︎
19.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). ↩︎
20.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). ↩︎
21. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). ↩︎
22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). ↩︎
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 14, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). ↩︎
24. Tribunale di Trapani, G.I.P. Piero Grillo, May 23, 2019 (It.). ↩︎
25.  Tribunale di Trapani, G.I.P. Piero Grillo, May 23, 2019 (It.). ↩︎
26. Tribunale di Trapani, G.I.P. Piero Grillo, May 23, 2019 (It.). ↩︎
27. Tribunale di Trapani, G.I.P. Piero Grillo, May 23, 2019 (It.). ↩︎
28.  Tribunale di Trapani, G.I.P. Piero Grillo, May 23, 2019 (It.). ↩︎
29. Libya: EU Conditions Remain Hellish as EU Marks 5 Years of Cooperation Agreements, Amnesty Int’l (Jan. 2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/. ↩︎
30.  Campbell McLachlan KC, Introduction, in The Principle of Systemic Integration in International Law ch. 1 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780192893741.003.0001. ↩︎
31.  Number of Refugees and Migrants Returned to Libya While Trying to Reach Europe from 2017 to 2023, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1241638/number-of-refugees-and-migrants-being-returned-to-libya-while-trying-to-reach-europe/ ↩︎
32.  Libya: EU Conditions Remain Hellish as EU Marks 5 Years of Cooperation Agreements, Amnesty Int’l (Jan. 2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/ ↩︎
33.  Libya: EU Conditions Remain Hellish as EU Marks 5 Years of Cooperation Agreements, Amnesty Int’l (Jan. 2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/. ↩︎
34. European Commission – Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, EU Delivers Support for Border Management in Libya, Eur. Comm’n (July 16, 2020), https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-delivers-support-border-management-libya-2020-07-16_en. ↩︎
35. Human Rights Watch, No Escape from Hell: EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya (2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya.  ↩︎
36. Human Rights Watch, No Escape from Hell: EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya (2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya.  ↩︎
37. Katerina Linos & Eyal Chachko, Refugee Responsibility Sharing or Responsibility Dumping?, 110 Cal. L. Rev. (2022), https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/calr110&section=24. ↩︎

Bibliography

International Treaties & Conventions

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.

Int’l Convention on Maritime Search & Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 118.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).

European Union & Governmental Reports

European Commission – Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, EU Delivers Support for Border Management in Libya, Eur. Comm’n (July 16, 2020), https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-delivers-support-border-management-libya-2020-07-16_en.

Legal Cases

Tribunale di Trapani, G.I.P. Piero Grillo, May 23, 2019 (It.).

Bilateral Agreements

Memorandum of Understanding on Migration Between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of National Accord of Libya, It.-Libya, Feb. 2, 2017, https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MEMORANDUM_IT_LIBIA.pdf.

Law Review Articles & Academic Books

Campbell McLachlan KC, Introduction, in The Principle of Systemic Integration in International Law ch. 1 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780192893741.003.0001.

Reports from NGOs & International Organizations

Human Rights Watch, No Escape from Hell: EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya (2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya.

Libya: EU Conditions Remain Hellish as EU Marks 5 Years of Cooperation Agreements, Amnesty Int’l (Jan. 2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/.

Data & Statistics

Number of Refugees and Migrants Returned to Libya While Trying to Reach Europe from 2017 to 2023, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1241638/number-of-refugees-and-migrants-being-returned-to-libya-while-trying-to-reach-europe/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2025).

Missing Migrants Project, Int’l Org. for Migration, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean (last visited Jan. 24, 2025).

Missing Migrants Project, Int’l Org. for Migration, https://missingmigrants.iom.int (last visited Jan. 24, 2025).

Web Sources & Organizational Reports

Alice Speri, The E.U. Is Still Sending Migrants to Libya to Suffer, Foreign Pol’y (July 4, 2023), https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/04/migrant-sea-rescue-mediterranean-libyan-coast-guard/.Search and Rescue Operations, SOS Méditerranée, https://www.sosmediterranee.org/understand-the-operations/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2025).